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RICO and the Legislative Supremacy Approach to
Federal Criminal Lawmaking
Brian Slocum*
I. INTRODUCTION
In interpreting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), the United States Supreme Court has not utilized a
coherent jurisprudence that would produce consistent results when
faced with unclear1 criminal statutes. The failure of the Supreme Court
to engage in a consistent jurisprudence, or to recognize the undefined
nature of RICO's statutory language, 2 has resulted in the almost
unlimited reach of RICO. The Court's inconsistent jurisprudence could
further encourage Congress to promulgate unclear criminal statutes and
thereby delegate power to the judiciary to define rules of criminal law. 3
This Article will discuss the criminal aspects of RICO as part of a
broader analysis of how courts should respond when Congress enacts
unclear criminal statutes.
This Article presents three possible approaches to the problem of
unclear criminal statutes. The first, a common law approach, directs
Brian Slocum graduated, cum laude, from Harvard Law School in 1999. Currently, he is
clerking for Judge Frank Magill on the United S.tates Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The author wishes to thank Professor David Shapiro and Ryan Johnson for their helpful sugges-
tions.
1. I use the term "unclear" as a synonym for "indeterminate" in referring to statutes that are
vague and/or ambiguous. See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philoso-
phical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509, 512 (1994) (commenting that the term "indeterminacy" in-
cludes the three distinct terms, "ambiguity," "contestability," and "vagueness").
2. See infra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court's incoherent approach to interpreting
RICO).
3. See Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the Ex-
ecutive Branch, 61-WTR L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47 (1998) ("Once content to leave the bulk
of criminal lawmaking to the states, Congress now reacts convulsively to every species of wrong-
doing that captures public attention, whether it be carjacking, child molestation, or celebrity
stalking."). Moreover, many states enact criminal statutes that model similar federal statutes. See
Jason D. Reichelt, Note, Stalking the Enterprise Criminal: State RICO and the Liberal Interpre-
tation of the Enterprise Element, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 224, 225 (1995) (noting that 29 states have
enacted their own RICO statutes, with only minor changes from federal RICO, since Congress
passed RICO in 1970).
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courts to recognize and affirm Congress' express delegation of
lawmaking authority in federal criminal law.4  The second, an
administrative law approach, directs the executive branch of the federal
government to be responsible for defining the operative rules of federal
criminal law. 5 The third, a legislative supremacy approach, requires the
courts to apply the judicial doctrines of unconstitutional vagueness and
the rule of lenity, thus placing the onus on Congress to enact statutes
that are clear.
6
This Article argues for the third approach. The legislative supremacy
approach promotes democracy by forcing the most politically
accountable branch of government, Congress, to resolve the difficult
and controversial issues of criminal lawmaking instead of delegating
those issues to a less politically accountable branch. This approach also
comports with the traditional American view of criminal lawmaking and
with the Supreme Court's preference for employing traditional methods
of statutory interpretation, as well as its reluctance to assume criminal
law rulemaking power.
As part of the legislative supremacy approach, two separate
doctrines, both aspects of due process, 7 would be used more vigorously
as nondelegation doctrines to force Congress to shoulder the burden of
criminal lawmaking. First, the rule of lenity8 would guide interpretation
of criminal statutes by directing courts to construe criminal statutes
narrowly and would mandate that a court elect the narrower of two
possible interpretations of the statute if that interpretation is plausible.
Second, the void-for-vagueness doctrine 9 would be used when the
statutory standards are so unclear that courts cannot apply a criminal
statute without engaging in common law rulemaking.10
4. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing the common law approach to in-
terpreting unclear criminal statutes).
5. See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (discussing the administrative law approach
to interpreting unclear criminal statutes).
6. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative supremacy ap-
proach to interpreting unclear criminal statutes).
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv.
405, 471 (1989). Sunstein notes that "[tihe due process clause provides a constitutional basis for
the rule of law ideal. The most celebrated aspect of this general idea is the rule of lenity, which
leads courts to resolve ambiguities favorably to the criminal defendant." Id.
8. See infra notes 122-47 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of lenity).
9. See infra notes 211-47 and accompanying text (discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
10. The Supreme Court has recently indicated its approval of these related doctrines. In
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), the Court described the "three related manifesta-
tions of the fair warning requirement" of due process. Id. at 266. The Court said that the first of
these manifestations is the vagueness doctrine; the second, described as a "junior version of the
vagueness doctrine," is the rule of lenity; and the third is that "due process bars courts from ap-
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This Article contends that, despite Congress' delegation of
lawmaking authority to it, the Supreme Court has not engaged in a
coherent interpretive jurisprudence when confronted with the task of
making sense out of the confusion of RICO's statutory language. It is
time for the Court to recognize that Congress has enacted an unclear
criminal statute and explicitly choose an interpretive approach to
effectively deal with the problem.
II. THREE APPROACHES TO UNCLEAR CRIMINAL STATUTES
A. RICO as an Unclear Statute
RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970."1 As defined in § 1962, RICO punishes three types of conduct:
(1) acquisition of an "enterprise" with money derived from a "pattern of
racketeering activity;"' 12 (2) acquisition of an "enterprise" through a
"pattern of racketeering;"']3 and (3) operation of an enterprise through
plying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any other
judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope." Id. (quoting H. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 95 (1968)). As discussed in Part III, however, the Court
does not apply these principles consistently.
11. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1999).
12. Section 1962(a) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or though collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section
2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the estab-
lishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities which af-
fect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for
purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the
control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his im-
mediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or
the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate
to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either
in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994).
13. Section 1962(b) reads "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racket-
eering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce." Id. § 1962(b).
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a "pattern of racketeering." 14 As defined in § 1961(5),15 a "pattern of
racketeering activity" is established when the accused commits at least
two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of one another. The
definition of "racketeering activity" in § 1961(1) includes a number of
federal offenses and state crimes.' 6  An "enterprise" is an amorphous,
14. Section 1962(c) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id. § 1962(c).
Section 1962(c) is by far the most often used of the substantive RICO offenses. The Eleventh
Circuit, in United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289 (11 th Cir. 1982), defined the substantive ele-
ments required to prove a RICO violation as follows:
(1) the existence of an enterprise; (2) that the enterprise affected interstate commerce;
(3) that the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (4) that he
participated, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise;
and (5) that he participated through a pattern of racketeering activity ....
Id. at 1323.
15. Section 1961(5) provides that a "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last
of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission
of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
16. Section 1961(1) provides that:
[R]acketeering activity means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a
controlled or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances
Act), which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of
title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to
sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (re-
lating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is feloni-
ous, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections
891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions) ... section 1084 (relating to the
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section
1343 (relating to wire fraud) ... section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), sec-
tion 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to
the obstruction of State or local law enforcement) ... section 1951 (relating to interfer-
ence with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering),
section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section
1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohi-
bition of illegal gambling businesses) . . . sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen property) ... sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in
contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act
which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with re-
strictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to
embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a
case under title 11 ... fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, im-
portation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled
or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act) punish-
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all inclusive concept that is defined in § 1961(4). 7
RICO is an example of a statute that provides for compound
liability. 18  Unlike most criminal statutes, RICO's crimes have no
delineated physical form.' 9  In contrast to traditional crimes like
burglary and murder, RICO does not define and prohibit particularly
described types of conduct. 20  Instead, RICO "is defined in terms of
abstract relationships: the 'enterprise' is a structure of relationships
among individuals or entities, and the 'pattern of racketeering' is a form
of relationship among crimes." 21 Because RICO, as drafted, is such a
broad and abstract statute, it is capable of extending to a number of
different types of conduct in a wide range of circumstances.
From its inception, RICO has ignited controversy. 22  Most
able under any law of the United States ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (West 1984 & Supp. 1999).
17. "Enterprise" is defined in § 1961(4), as "includ[ing] any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994).
18. Other examples of federal, compound criminal statutes include the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise statute (CCE), 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1999), the Gambling Business statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1955 (1994), and the Continuing Financial Crimes Enterprise statute, 18 U.S.C. § 225
(1994). For a discussion of the growing prominence of compound liability in federal criminal law
and its affect on traditional precepts of criminal law, see Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and
Other Complex Crimes: The Transformation of American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 239 (1993); see also Eric S. Miller, Note, Compound-Complex Criminal Statutes and the
Constitution: Demanding Unanimity as to Predicate Acts, 104 YALE L.J. 2277, 2278 (1995) (ar-
guing that "the recent advent of the compound-complex criminal statute, with its novel definitions
of crime and its elements, has strained the limits of criminal procedure and effectively taken the
right to a unanimous verdict away from a large and growing class of federal criminal defen-
dants").
19. See Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43
VAND. L. REV. 769, 777 (1990).
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Christopher J. Moran, Comment, Is the "Darling" in Danger? "Void for Vague-
ness "-The Constitutionality of the RICO Pattern Requirement, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1697, 1697 n.4
(1991) (stating that the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, the Securities Industry Association, the American Bankers Association, the
Independent Bankers Association of America, the Future Industries Association, the American
Council of Life Insurance, the Credit Union Nation Association, the Grocery Manufacturers of
America, the National Automobile Dealers Association, the State Farm Insurance Companies, the
Alliance of American Insurers, and the American Financial Services Association have all called
for reform of RICO); Can RICO be Reformed?, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 1989, at
A16 (proposing that RICO be repealed); Giuliani's Legacy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25 1989, at A18
(stating that "only the complete repeal of RICO can guarantee an end to injustices in its name");
It's Time to Rescind RICO, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1989, at B6 (arguing that "RICO's widening
application in an astonishing array of cases makes it imperative that Congress erase this law from
the books").
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commentators believe that RICO's statutory terms are unclear.23
Recognizing the statute's vagueness, courts have occasionally indicated
sensitivity to possible governmental abuse of the RICO statute. 24 In an
early RICO case, United States v. Anderson,25 the court warned that
"[b]road interpretation and simplistic resolution of the complicated
statutory language pose the danger of enhancing [RICO's] popularity
beyond the intentions of Congress by bringing within the sphere of
RICO minor offenses and by intruding on state power." 26
Some scholars have called for the repeal or substantial reform of
RICO because it has been used in a much broader fashion than
Congress originally intended and the gap between the legislative goals
of RICO and its practical impact is significant. 27 It has been argued that
the main reason for the broad use of RICO is "the elasticity of RICO's
limiting principles of 'predicate' acts, a 'pattern' of racketeering
conduct, and an involved 'enterprise."' 28  One commentator argues
that:
While these terms were meant to distinguish between the common
criminal and the organized criminal, they were not equal to the task.
Accordingly, RICO's perceived and actual overbreadth can be traced
23. See, e.g., Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1290 (3d Cir. 1995) (commenting that "[i]f we
examine the language of the statute itself, in an attempt to discern the scope of civil RICO, we
find ourselves lost in a land with few signposts"); In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Products Liability
Litigation, 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1471 (D. Colo. 1987) (commenting that "RICO is just.., a rather
sloppily thought out kind of way to get the Mafia that everybody jumps on so they can have more
fun with fraud"); Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 815
(1990) (noting that while the legislative history of RICO demonstrates that Congress wanted to
limit its application by using terms like "enterprise," "pattern," and "racketeering activity," courts
have interpreted these terms broadly such that their limiting effect is minimal); Jeffrey Standen,
An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 289
(1998) (arguing that RICO's definitions are tautological and "accomplish little more than to grant
authority to prosecutors and judges to shape the contours of the law"); Barry Tarlow, RICO Re-
visited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 294 (1983) (arguing that "the scope of the RICO statute has been
expanded far beyond what was intended by Congress"); Peter Skomorowsky, Comment, Is This
the End of Big RICO? Comment on Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion in H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co., 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 733, 754-55 (1990) (asserting that Congress
defined RICO's proscribed conduct in "vague terms solely with the hope of circumventing a con-
stitutional challenge that status, without more, cannot be criminalized").
24. See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that RICO's
potentially broad reach posed danger for abuse if used by a prosecutor in situations for which
Congress did not originally intend).
25. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
26. Id. at 1364 n.8.
27. See, e.g., Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691,
692-93 (1990) (stating that "the gap between the legislative goals of RICO and its practical im-
pact is dramatic," and calling for reconsideration of RICO's purpose and effects).
28. Id. at 695 (referring to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), (4), (5) (1994)).
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directly to the failure of these statutory terms to place meaningful
limits on RICO's reach in either criminal or civil prosecutions.
29
Further exacerbating the problems caused by the seemingly unlimited
reach of RICO's statutory terms, Congress also inserted a liberal
construction clause into the RICO statutory scheme. Section 904(a)
provides that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes." 30  In general, however, courts have
not relied on this clause in broadly construing RICO. Instead, they have
relied on plain meaning theories of statutory interpretation. For
example, in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 31 the Supreme Court said that the
clause does not help in determining what the purposes of the statute are
and that the purposes must be gleaned from the statute through the
normal means of interpretation. 32 The clause "only serves as an aid for
resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one."
33
It has been argued that broad interpretations of RICO have produced
many invidious effects. Among those effects are: (1) the prejudicial
effect of the use of the term "racketeering" on judges and juries, 34 (2)
the expansion of federal jurisdiction over local crimes traditionally
prosecuted by states, 35 (3) the ability to reprosecute defendants for
transactions that previously have been fully litigated,36 (4) the
imposition of disproportionately severe punishment and novel
29. Id.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 904(a) (1994) (quoting Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947).
31. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
32. See id. at 184.
33. Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 n.10 (1985), quoting Cal-
lanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961)). Although courts do not rely on the liberal con-
struction clause when construing RICO in criminal cases, they have relied on it in civil cases. For
example, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985), the Court said that "RICO is to
be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously expansive language
and overall approach, (citation omitted) but also of its express admonition that RICO is to 'be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."' Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 497-98 (1985); see also infra note 209 (discussing further the liberal construction clause).
34. See Tarlow, supra note 23, at 293-94. "One difficulty that continues to plague RICO
prosecutions is the prejudicial impact that results from labeling the conduct of a defendant, who
may be a businessman, politician, or alleged gangster, as racketeering." Id.
35. RICO has been used to prosecute crimes such as rigged card games in an individual's ho-
tel suite. See United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court has
consistently given RICO a broad interpretation, allowing it to invade traditional state domains of
criminal prosecution even as some members of the Court have expressed concern over the in-
creasing federalization of criminal law. See William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The
Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1993).
36. See Tarlow, supra note 23, at 401-08 (noting problems that arise, for example, when the
predicate crime has been fully litigated prior to the RICO litigation or the government alleges
multiple § 1962(d) offenses out of the same transaction).
20001
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sanctions, 37 (5) courts' employment of orders barring a defendant from
using available assets to post bail and obtain legal representation or
prepare a defense, 38 (6) joining defendants whose conduct is unrelated,
orchestrating mass trials, and admitting prejudicial evidence that would
be barred in any conspiracy prosecution, 39 and (7) chilling the exercise
of First Amendment rights.
n°
Part of the controversy over RICO stems from those who view
RICO's legislative history as indicating a more limited purpose for
RICO than has occurred. It has been suggested that "[w]hen Congress
considered RICO in 1969 and 1970, [RICO's] objective was as clear as
[the name of the Act of which it was a part]: The Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. ",41 Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman of the
Criminal Law and Procedures Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, introduced the Senate bill that became the Organized Crime
37. Judge Posner, in affirming a judge's upward departure in the sentencing of the notorious
"Chicago Outfit," said that "[h]ad the guideline range for RICO offenses been set with the Chi-
cago Outfit in mind, it would have greatly overpunished the run of the mill criminal activities that
are the routine grist of RICO prosecutions." United States v. Rainone, 32 F.3d 1203, 1209 (7th
Cir. 1994).
The provisional remedies of RICO, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(e) (West 1984 & Supp. 1999),
amended by, Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title H, § 302, 98 Stat.
2040, permit a court to enter a restraining order before trial, freezing the defendant's potentially
forfeitable assets to assure their availability for forfeiture if the defendant is convicted. "RICO
forfeitures are not keyed exclusively to the size of the crime" because RICO allows for forfeiture
"of the defendant's entire 'interest in' the enterprise," which can be devastating in the case of or-
dinary business people who become involved in fraudulent activities. Lynch, supra note 19, at
781-82.
38. See Glenn Beard et al., Comment, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 33
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 929, 951-54 (1996) (discussing RICO asset forfeiture provisions).
39. See Lynch, supra note 19, at 787 (explaining that evidence of a defendant's other crimes,
even those that are different in their nature or that occurred in the distant past, becomes relevant
because those crimes become part of the "pattern of racketeering," and evidence that a defendant
associates with criminal colleagues is necessary to prove the existence of the enterprise).
40. See The Supreme Court 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 358 (1994)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 246 (1994), will chill some protest activities because of fear of RICO suits).
Given the expansive and growing list of predicate RICO offenses, the lack of prosecu-
torial discretion in civil RICO cases, the intense hatred many groups on opposite sides
of ideological divides feel for one another, and the indeterminate nature of exactly
what constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity, protest organizations have reason to
face with trepidation the repercussions of RICO.
Id.
41. Reed, supra note 27, at 693. Reed also claims that Congress chose indirect means to fight
organized crime because it was concerned that drafting statutory language proscribing member-
ship in organized crime would raise constitutional questions about status offenses and vagueness.
See id.
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Control Act of 1970 (OCCA) on January 15, 1969.42 When he
introduced RICO, Senator McClellan said that "[T]itle IX is aimed at
removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations." 43  Other
sponsors, such as Senator Roman Hruska, agreed that the purpose of
RICO was to combat the influence of organized crime in legitimate
business.4
4
Although the subject of much criticism, substantial congressional
reform of RICO appears remote because even if the critics' analysis of
RICO is accurate, Congress has endorsed the judiciary's broad
interpretations of RICO and shows no signs of dissatisfaction. 45
Congress added new predicate offenses, which trigger a RICO violation,
in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, and 1996.46 In 1984, RICO was
significantly amended.47 Congress, however, has never modified the
criminal aspects of the statute in an attempt to narrow its scope.48  It
42. See S. Res. 30, 91st Cong., 115 CONG. REC. 827 (1969). At the time of introduction, the
bill did not contain a private right to action. See id. Thus, the government was the only party that
could pursue civil remedies. See id.
43. 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970).
44. See id. at 602. "Title IX of this act is designed to remove the influence of organized crime
from legitimate business by attacking its property interests and by removing its members from
control of legitimate businesses which have been acquired or operated by unlawful racketeering
methods." Id. Senator Edward Kennedy said that "IT]itle IX ... may provide us with new tools
to prevent organized crime from taking over legitimate businesses and activities." Id. at 845.
45. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661, 712-13 (1987). Lynch comments that:
While it may be dangerous to draw authoritative conclusions about the legislators' at-
titudes toward the body of RICO law developed by the courts over a decade and a half
from such haphazardly drafted legislation, it would appear obvious that Congress is
reasonably satisfied with what prosecutors and courts have made of RICO .... If
RICO has evolved into something different from what Congress intended at its crea-
tion, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Congress has looked at what has
evolved, and pronounced it good.
Id.
46. See 18 U.S.C § 1961(1) (1996). Some of the added predicate offenses include financial
institution fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and criminal infringement of copyright, 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
47. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. III, sec. 302, §
1963 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963), ch. IX, sec. 901, § 1961(1) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)), ch. X, sec. 1020, § 1961(1) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)), ch. XXIII, sec.
2301, § 1963 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963). The 1984 amendments occurred in three
stages. First, Congress amended the forfeiture provisions of § 1963 to clarify proceeds forfeiture
and other matters and amended § 1961 to add crimes dealing in obscene matter (under state law
and §§ 1461-65) and currency violations under Title 31 to the list of predicate acts. Second,
Congress added as predicate offenses three automobile theft violations (Motor Vehicle Theft Law
Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-547, sec. 205, § 1961(1) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1))). Third, Congress deleted some expedition-of-action language from the civil provisions
of §§ 1964(b) and 1966.
48. Congress, however, has narrowed the civil aspects of the statute. In 1995, as part of an
overhaul of private federal securities litigation, Congress enacted § 107 of the PSLRA, providing
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appears that Congress is comfortable with its delegation of power to the
judiciary to define criminal conduct pursuant to RICO and approves of
courts' interpretation and application of RICO.49
B. Approaches to Unclear Criminal Statutes
A person's philosophy towards the interpretation of unclear criminal
statutes depends on his or her view of the proper role of the courts,
Congress, and the Executive Branch. Although the proper roles of the
judiciary and Congress in the area of statutory interpretation and
rulemaking in the area of criminal law are necessarily matters of degree,
clear differences in philosophies concerning those roles make possible a
fairly accurate categorization of approaches. Professor Dan Kahan
describes these competing approaches to federal criminal lawmaking.50
1. The Common Law Approach
The common law approach, which is the current de facto regime,51
directs the courts to recognize and affirm Congress' implicit delegation
of lawmaking authority in federal criminal law. 52  This approach
requires the courts to craft legal rules to fill in the interstices of broad
criminal statutes. 53  In Professor Kahan's view, the common law
approach conceives of the operative rules of federal criminal law as
judicially-derived, analogous to the way that the operative rules of
federal antitrust and labor law are judicially derived.54 The common
law approach would give the courts normative discretion to engage in
ad hoc balancing of the benefits of broad and narrow readings of
criminal statutes. 55  Professor Kahan argues that the common law
approach's many inherent virtues include improvement of the quality of
"no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase
or sale of securities to establish a violation of [RICO]." Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No 104-67, sec. 107, § 1964(c) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
49. See Lynch, supra note 45, at 712-13 (inferring through Congress' inaction that it approves
of the courts' interpretation of RICO).
50. See Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 5 (1997) (discussing three competing conceptions of federal criminal-lawmaking: the
legislative supremacy position, the common law position, and the administrative law position).
51. See id. at 5 (arguing that the common law conception "offers the best description of fed-
eral criminal-lawmaking as it currently exists").
52. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345,
352.
53. See Kahan, supra note 50, at 11.
54. See id. at 6.
55. See Kahan, supra note 52, at 378.
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federal criminal law, 56 more efficient updating of legal norms, 57 greater
power to avoid loopholes in statutes,58 and less expense because of the
generative character of open-textured statutory terms.59
2. The Administrative Law Approach
The second approach to unclear criminal statutes, which Kahan
believes is normatively superior to the other two conceptions, is the
administrative law approach of federal criminal lawmaking. 60 The
administrative law approach would delegate the responsibility for
defining the operative rules of federal criminal law to the Executive
Branch.61  The Executive Branch, through the Justice Department,
56. See id. at 352. Professor Kahan argues that delegated common lawmaking would improve
the quality of federal criminal law, because Congress necessarily makes its rules in anticipation of
future cases and thus lacks full information about how these rules would actually operate in the
real world. See id. Courts, on the other hand, see how statutes interact with real-world circum-
stances, and with each other, and are better situated to fashion rules of law that fully implement
legislative goals and that avoid unforeseen conflicts with other values and policies. See id. at
353.
57. See id. at 352. Professor Kahan argues that time spent on specifying the details of the
criminal statute is spent at the expense of time spent on matters of broad public policy on which
Congress prefers to focus its energies. See id. It is also easier to generate political consensus for
a delegation standard than for specific rules of law because the rules produced under a delegation
standard would be general and would not attempt resolution of the most controversial issues. See
id. The efficiency gained from the common law conception of rulemaking is especially important
in the context of federal criminal lawmaking. Although the public is very concerned with "law
and order," criminal lawmaking has historically comprised a very small part of Congress' docket
because there is no real constituency for the rule of law in criminal law. See id. at 370. There-
fore, Congress can satisfy the public's demand for criminal statutes by enacting highly general,
often symbolic, criminal statutes and focus its attention on matters of concern to highly organized
interest groups, which are "more likely than the public generally to reward legislators for benefits
conferred and to punish for disabilities imposed." Id.
58. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law, 110 HARV. L. REV
469, 482-83 (1996) (arguing that under-specified norms in criminal statutes avoid the problems of
loopholes because the norms "can be extended beyond their core applications to all analogous but
unforeseen forms of wrongdoing").
59. See id. at 481-82 (arguing that it is cheaper for courts to fill out incompletely specified
criminal statutes than it would be for Congress to enact a fully specified criminal code, and that
the higher cost of a nondelegation doctrine would lower Congress' output, a significant social
cost).
60. At this time, Professor Kahan has written four articles on delegation of rulemaking power
in federal criminal law. In his first article, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, Professor
Kahan argues for the abolition of the rule of lenity (the legislative supremacy approach) and an
increased role for the common law conception. See Kahan, supra note 52. In his second article,
Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law, Kahan, while still arguing that the common law
approach is superior to the legislative supremacy approach, advocates that the administrative law
approach is superior to both of the other approaches. See Kahan, supra note 58. In his third and
fourth articles, Kahan continues to refine and advocate his administrative law approach to inter-
preting federal criminal law. See Kahan, supra notes 3 & 50.
61. See Kahan, supra note 50, at 5-6.
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would carry out this task "by promulgating legally binding rules akin to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, or by announcing statutory
interpretations to which courts would be bound to defer in criminal
prosecutions." 62
Kahan recommends that the courts convert the existing regime of
federal criminal lawmaking from a common law approach to an
administrative law approach by employing two established canons of
statutory construction: "the Chevron rule,63 which courts should use to
uphold statutory constructions formally defended by the Department of
Justice in advance of prosecution; and the rule of lenity, which courts
should use to compel narrow interpretations in all other cases." 64 The
Chevron rule would require courts to defer to the Justice Department's
reasonable resolution of a statutory ambiguity on the ground that its
"expertise and democratic accountability make it the preferred delegated
lawmaker." 65 The rule of lenity would be invoked only when a "broad
reading ... advanced by the prosecution ha[d] not been formally
articulated and justified in advance by the Justice Department." 66
Kahan argues that the "administrative-law approach would conserve
essentially all of the efficiency benefits associated with implied
delegation." 67  Moreover, "because the Justice Department has more
experience with criminal law enforcement than does any court, and
because it is more unified than the judiciary," Kahan argues that "an
administrative regime would likely enhance both the quality and
consistency of federal criminal-lawmaking relative to the existing
common lawmaking" method.68 Moreover, the administrative law
approach would avoid the tensions between common lawmaking and
the values of democracy and fair notice because the Justice Department
62. Id.
63. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court formulated a two-step test to determine the deference a
court should accord an agency interpretation of a statute that it administers. See id. at 842-44.
The first step requires the court to inquire whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue" before the agency. Id. at 842. If so, the court must "give effect to the unambi-
guously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 843. If, however, the court decides that "the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," it proceeds to the second step, which
requires the court to defer to any "reasonable interpretation" made by the agency. Id. at 843-44.
64. Kahan, supra note 50, at 21.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 22.
67. Id. at 18.
68. Id. This is a valid criticism of the common law conception of federal criminal lawmaking.
As underscored by the history of the RICO statute, if the courts were to engage in criminal com-
mon iawmaking, the sheer number of district and appellate court judges who participate in the
process would pose immense obstacles to its consistent and rational exercise.
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is accountable to the President and, therefore, more politically
accountable than judges.69  Kahan argues that an administrative
lawmaking regime would moderate the partisanship of criminal-
lawmaking by placing responsibility in the hands of "distant and largely
invisible bureaucrats" within the Justice Department.70  This proposed
regime differs from the present situation where the Executive Branch
influences the formation of federal common law crimes almost entirely
through the uncoordinated actions of individual U.S. Attorneys. 71
69. See id. at 19.
70. id. at 18-19.
71. Although possessing arguable merit, the administrative law approach has weighty prob-
lems that preclude it from being an acceptable solution to the problem of vague criminal statutes.
One problem with the administrative law approach is that it would involve institutional self-
dealing. See Kahan, supra note 50, at 18. The administrative law approach would grant authority
over the interpretation of the federal criminal laws to the organization that is to enforce those
laws. The Justice Department has claimed that it exercises self-restraint in its interpretation of
RICO, but it is clear that the Justice Department is partly responsible for bringing prosecutions
that have resulted in the extremely wide scope given to RICO. The Justice Department has its
own set of guidelines and "blue sheets" that bind all federal prosecutors, and the Criminal Divi-
sion's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section reviews and approves all RICO prosecutions.
See Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036, 1043 (1990). Despite these constraints, RICO has been prose-
cuted in a very broad manner. See, e.g., United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (re-
viewing the prosecution of a criminal organization's janitor and handyman who was unaware of
the criminal enterprise); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that
the defendant engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity" based solely on the defendant's par-
ticipation in a restaurant assassination); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983) (re-
viewing prosecution of members of a terrorist organization seeking Croatian independence);
United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (reviewing the prosecution of an individual
rigging card games in his hotel suite as a pattern of racketeering activity). Another problem with
the administrative law conception is the lack of political accountability of its decision-makers.
While an administrative agency is perhaps more politically accountable than the judiciary, gov-
emnment bureaucrats are not as politically accountable to Congress. Kahan calls Justice Depart-
ment officials "[d]istant and largely invisible bureaucrats." Kahan, supra note 3, at 54. "Distant
and largely invisible bureaucrats," however, do not possess the democratic accountability that
those who make criminal law should possess. But see id. (arguing that the Department of Justice
is accountable to the public through the President).
Although the Chevron rule may be an appropriate use of agency expertise in the civil context,
criminal statutes should be treated differently. One judge who has considered the issue and
agreed is Judge Kenneth W. Starr. In United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
Judge Starr wrote for the court of appeals that criminal defendants are "far outside Chevron terri-
tory," and refused to defer to the interpretation by the Justice Department of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938. Id. at 1077. The need for political accountability is most important in
the criminal context. All other things being equal, in situations involving the moral condemna-
tion of the community and the loss of liberty, the most politically accountable branch of govern-
ment should make the rules. See Lisa K. Sachs, Strict Construction of the Rule of Lenity in the
Interpretation of Environmental Crimes, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600, 632 (1996) (arguing that
"determining which types of conduct should be punishable by criminal sanctions-the highest
measure of condemnation-involves 'a special kind of value judgment' traditionally within the
province of the legislature"). Professor Lawrence Solan also takes issue with Kahan's proposi-
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3. The Legislative Supremacy Approach
The third approach to unclear federal criminal statutes is the
legislative supremacy approach of federal criminal lawmaking. The
legislative supremacy approach considers federal crimes as essentially
legislative in origin. Congress defines the crime in a statute and courts
carry out Congress' intent through conventional statutory
interpretation. 72  The legislative supremacy conception requires that
courts place the onus on Congress to enact clear statutes using
historically rooted judicial devices such as the doctrines of
unconstitutional vagueness and the rule of lenity. The legislative
supremacy approach would help promote the principles of judicial
restraint, political accountability, and consistent statutory interpretation.
The legislative supremacy approach limits the likelihood that courts
will engage in creating common law crimes based on inferences that go
beyond the language actually contained in the statute. 73 It is important
to recognize, however, that the legislative supremacy conception does
not mandate criminal statutes that are narrow in scope. Congress can
enact criminal statutes with a broad scope, but it must clarify the
intended breadth of these statutes. Courts that interpret such a statute
would be bound to implement its broad coverage. Of course, Congress
can refuse to shoulder the burden of criminal lawmaking and enact an
unclear statute. Under the legislative supremacy approach, however,
courts would recognize the absence of a clear statutory definition and
would, accordingly, construe the statute narrowly.
tions. See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 130-34
(1998). Solan argues, among other things, that (1) contrary to Kahan's assertions, "there is little
reason to believe that the Justice Department is that much more expert at interpreting criminal
statutes than are the courts," (2) Kahan's proposal would mean the "elimination of stare decisis in
criminal law" because of the differing philosophies of Presidents, and (3) there should not be an
abandonment of "thoughtful judicial decision making in favor of a regime in which the prosecutor
wins whenever the executive branch beats the courts to the punch." Id.
72. See Kahan, supra note 50, at 5.
73. This was a concern of the Court in United States v. Sheldon, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 119
(1817). In Sheldon, the Court refused to extend a statute that made illegal to transport munitions
or provisions from the United States to Canada "in any waggon [sic], cart, sleigh, boat or other-
wise," to include oxen driven over the Canadian border. Id. at 120. The Court construed "other-
wise" as limited to the kinds of vehicles enumerated in the statute. See id. at 121. The Court ad-
mitted that "the mischief is the same, whether the enemy be supplied with provisions in the one
way or the other," but refused to interpret the statute as addressing this evil without clear lan-
guage from Congress supporting such a move. Id. The principle exhibited in Sheldon (limiting
the reach of a criminal statute even though interpreting the statute broadly to include analogous
behavior would be congruent with the purpose of the statute) has been referred to as "the linguis-
tic wall." See Solan, supra note 71, at 84.
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One argument against the legislative supremacy approach, coming
from a public choice perspective, is that courts should update criminal
statutes because updating is a particularly difficult task for the
legislature. 74 Because organized interest will oppose specific legislation
that explicitly resolves difficult and controversial issues, a legislature
may draft an ambiguous bill and delegate rulemaking responsibility to
agency or judicial discretion allowing all sides to claim victory. 75
Moreover, general criminal statutes are likely to satisfy the general
public's demand for criminal law while still being able to be
expeditiously enacted by Congress.76
The legislative supremacy approach, however, can accommodate the
realities of the modern legislative process in which Congress faces both
time and political constraints. Although the legislative supremacy
approach will make it harder for Congress to make criminal law by
raising the practical and institutional cost of such legislation, the costs
of this should not be overstated. For example, when a court does
interpret a criminal statute narrowly, the Department of Justice has a
superior record for obtaining overrides. 77
Ambiguity and uncertainty are inevitable by-products of the
legislative process. Certainly Congress is faced both with time
constraints, which limit its ability to give sufficient thought to all of the
alternatives and possibilities, and with political constraints, which
encourage loose drafting methods designed to avoid provoking intense
controversy among powerful interest groups who may threaten to block
74. See Kahan, supra note 52, at 353.
75. See Kahan, supra note 3, at 50.
76. See Kahan, supra note 50, at 10. Kahan's theory mirrors public choice theory. A promi-
nent aspect of public choice theory is the belief that the legislative process is "a microeconomic
system in which actual political choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and groups to
further their own interests." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 52 (2d ed.
1995) (quotation omitted). Because most criminal statutes concentrate their benefits among a
highly dispersed group of people (the general public) but concentrate their costs on a small orga-
nized group of people (criminals and interest groups), public choice theorists postulate that the
best legislative solution for self-interested representatives would be to draft an ambiguous bill and
delegate rulemaking authority. See id. at 56. Of course, it should be noted that public choice the-
ory, even if accurate, merely describes what it views as the current description of the political
process rather than making a normative argument about how Congress and the judiciary should
handle criminal statutes. See generally id. at 57-61 (discussing the application of public choice
theory as well as alternative approaches to the political process).
77. See William Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 348 (1991). Professor Eskridge's article casts doubt on the proposition that
the forces against criminal expansion have greater power than the forces in favor of criminal ex-
pansion. Professor Eskridge notes that "criminal defendants and suspects.., have had virtually
no success in obtaining overrides." Id. at 352.
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legislation. 78  These concerns, however, argue against delegation of
lawmaking authority to the courts, not in favor of delegation. Congress
should absorb the full political costs of the criminal legislation that it
enacts. The courts should not allow Congress to avoid political costs by
delegating the responsibility of criminal law rulemaking to the
judiciary.
Under the legislative supremacy model, courts would take a more
aggressive stance in interpreting federal criminal statutes in order to
force Congress, in the text of a statute, to make the tough political
choices concerning the scope of a statute. 79 The legislative supremacy
approach avers that judicial attempts to force Congress to shoulder the
burden of criminal lawmaking are possible and laudatory. It recognizes
that a criminal code under the legislative supremacy model is more
costly and less efficient than the common law or administrative law
models but asserts that the principle of political accountability
outweighs the higher costs and reduced efficiency. 80
78. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (illustrating that Congress often drafts an
ambiguous bill in order to meet political demands and to avoid pressures).
79. See Kahan, supra note 52, at 351. Kahan argues that greater use of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine and the rule of lenity is a dubious strategy because Congress' default of its lawmaking
obligations is the "product of powerful and long-standing institutional dynamics" and "judicial
attempts to force Congress to shoulder the entire burden of federal criminal lawmaking are likely
to prove futile." Kahan, supra note 3, at 52-53. As support for his argument, Kahan cites
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), where after the Court invoked lenity to invalidate
the judicially constructed "intangible rights" theory of mail fraud, Congress enacted § 1346,
which simply engrafted the "intangible right to honest services" standard, another empty standard
that depends on judge-made implementing doctrines, onto the preexisting mail fraud statute. Id.
at 53 n.31. Kahan's argument, at least to some degree, proves the opposite of his claims.
McNally illustrates how federal criminal law is supposed to work: the courts narrowly construe
the criminal statute and, if Congress believes that the statute should extend further, it is free to
enact legislation explicitly providing for that result. The problem of Congress responding to a
narrow interpretation of a statute by enacting a broad and undefined standard can be remedied
through a more consistent and aggressive judicial response to undefined statutes. Congress resists
the judiciary's efforts to force it to shoulder the burden of criminal lawmaking because those ef-
forts are sporadic and inconsistent. A more consistent and aggressive judicial response would
preclude Congress from delegating lawmaking authority as it did in McNally and in its aftermath.
For example, after Congress enacted the vague "intangible right to honest services" provision, the
judiciary could have interpreted the language narrowly or struck it down on void-for-vagueness
grounds. See infra Parts IV-V (discussing the rule of lenity and void-for-vagueness doctrines).
80. Enormous institutional constraints weigh against the idea of either the common law or the
administrative law conception of federal criminal lawmaking. Three doctrines which have re-
dounded to the advantage of the legislative supremacy conception of federal criminal law have
constrained the relationship between the courts and common law rulemaking in the twentieth
century. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Stat-
utes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 189 (1985). First, "[t]he principle of legality, or nulla poena sine lege,
condemns judicial crime creation." Id. Second, the "constitutional doctrine of void-for-
vagueness forbids wholesale legislative delegation of lawmaking authority to the courts." Id.
Third, the "rule of strict construction directs that judicial resolution of residual uncertainty in the
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S INCOHERENT APPROACH TO
INTERPRETING RICO
Professor Kahan claims that RICO is an example of the Supreme
Court adhering to the common law approach to statutory
interpretation. 8 1  Kahan argues, however, that the contribution the
Supreme Court has made in defining RICO is not the product of a
"lawless usurpation of congressional prerogative." 82 Rather, he asserts,
the Court's interstitial rulemaking in RICO is a consequence of the
incompleteness of the RICO statute that Congress enacted.83 Kahan
argues that the implied delegation of lawmaking authority from
Congress to the courts is a politically legitimate "strategy for
maximizing Congress' policymaking influence in the face of constraints
on its power to make law." 8
4
Kahan argues that Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the
judiciary by leaving RICO's key terms undefined.85 Despite this
delegation of responsibility, however, it is clear that when interpreting
RICO, the Supreme Court has engaged in both the common law
conception of federal criminal lawmaking and the legislative supremacy
conception while claiming to adhere strictly to the legislative supremacy
approach to statutory interpretation. 86 Even if Congress may delegate,
and courts may legitimately exercise, criminal lawmaking authority, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to countenance this delegation in the
RICO context.87  Even if the Court, using common law methods, has
meaning of penal statutes be biased in favor of the accused." Id.
81. See Kahan, supra note 50, at 8.
82. Id. at 9.
83. See id.
84. Id. Kahan, though, as described above, prefers the administrative law conception to the
common law conception. He recognizes that a full common law conception of criminal-
lawmaking is "not a particularly realistic or sensible strategy." Kahan, supra note 3, at 53. Be-
cause, however, the administrative law conception is not likely to be implemented because of its
substantial departure from the current system, it is believed that the real battle is between the
common law and legislative supremacy positions. See infra note 102 (arguing that the Supreme
Court will likely continue to employ a narrow reading of the statute). More accurately, the batter
is between the current incoherent mix of common law and legislative supremacy methods and a
pure legislative supremacy conception.
85. See Kahan, supra note 50, at 8.
86. See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985);
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's utilization of the common law conception and its version of the leg-
islative supremacy approach to federal criminal lawmaking).
87. See infra notes 103-18 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Court has continu-
ally declined a common law rulemaking approach).
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fashioned a body of RICO law similar to the body of law shaped in the
fields of antitrust, civil rights, and labor law, 88 these common law
efforts in the RICO context have not been performed with any kind of
purposeful self-awareness. 89
Instead, the Court, in attempting to divine the scope of RICO, has
applied textualist methods and has claimed to follow a legislative
supremacy approach, seemingly unaware that the judiciary has been
delegated legislative lawmaking authority over the interpretation of
RICO. The Court's ostensible adherence to textualist methodology and
legislative supremacy has not produced consistent results, however,
because even when the Court has declined to engage in common law
rulemaking, it has not engaged in a coherent interpretative methodology
that would help it cope with the unclearness of RICO. 90
The Supreme Court's willingness to engage in common law
rulemaking in its decisions has come mostly in cases where the text of
the RICO statute has been unhelpful in resolving an issue that must be
resolved for RICO to function at all. An example of this common law
rulemaking occurred in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,91
where the Supreme Court had to interpret RICO's definition of "pattern
of racketeering activity." 92 The Court recognized that § 1961(5) did not
define "pattern of racketeering," but merely stated a minimum necessary
condition for the existence of such a pattern.93 The Court stated that the
text of RICO was unhelpful in defining "pattern of racketeering
activity" because "[t]he text of RICO conspicuously fails anywhere to
identify ... forms of relationship or external principles to be used in
determining whether racketeering activity falls into a pattern for
purposes of the Act."94
The Court was left in a quandary. The Court could either declare that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague or engage in common law
88. See Kahan, supra note 52, at 353.
89. See infra notes 119-31 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court has provided inade-
quate justifications for its interpretation and has thus yielded an incoherent approach).
90. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (advocating the legislative supremacy ap-
proach).
91. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994). To convict a defendant of a RICO violation, other than for an
"unlawful debt," under § 1962 (a), (b), or (c), the government must prove that the defendant en-
gaged in "pattern of racketeering activity" as defined by § 1961(5). 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c)
(1994).
93. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237.
94. Id. at 238. The Court inferred from this absence of direction in the text of § 1961(5) that
Congress intended a flexible approach to the interpretation of a "pattern." See id. at 239.
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rulemaking. 95 The Court resolved its dilemma by engaging in common
law rulemaking in order to give definition to "pattern of racketeering
activity." 96  The Court's common law methods consisted of using
legislative history, other statutes, and cases decided by other courts.
97
Through its process of common law rulemaking, the Court developed a
two-prong test, requiring "relatedness" 98 and "continuity," 99 neither of
95. Other courts have agreed that RICO's "pattern of racketeering activity" was left unde-
fined. In People v. Chaussee 11, 880 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1994), the Supreme Court of Colorado
compared its state RICO statute with the federal RICO statute. See id. at 753. The court held that
the Colorado statute's definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" was complete and self-
contained because it began with the word "means." Id. at 757. The court noted that, in contrast,
the federal statute's use of the word "'requires' among a group of definitions otherwise employ-
ing the words 'means' or 'includes' was very suggestive that section 1961(5) was not intended to
be a self-contained definition for purposes of RICO." Id.; see also Bart A. Karwath, Note, Has
the Constituency of Continuity Plus Relationship Put an End to RICO's Pattern of Confusion, 18
AM. J. CRIM. L. 201, 212 (1991) (noting that, after H.J. Inc., problems in interpreting the Court's
opinion caused lower courts to apply varying RICO pattern standards).
96. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236. The Court noted:
Congress has done nothing in the interim further to illuminate RICO's key requirement
of a pattern of racketeering; and as the plethora of different views expressed by the
Courts of Appeals since Sedima demonstrates developing a meaningful concept of
"pattern" within the existing framework has proved to be no easy task.
It is, nevertheless, a task we must undertake in order to decide this case.
Id. (citation omitted).
97. See id. at 239-41.
98. See id. at 240. The Court looked to a provision elsewhere in the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 for guidance in determining the definition of the "relatedness" element. See id. at
239-40. The Court adopted the Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act's pattern require-
ment in § 3575(e) verbatim: "[ciriminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." Id. at
240.
99. See id. The Court recognized that § 3575 was of no assistance in defining the "continuity"
prong, but, nevertheless, determined that the Eighth Circuit's "multiple scheme" test "brings a
rigidity to the available methods of proving a pattern that simply is not present in the idea of
'continuity' itself." Id. at 240-41. The Court decided that "continuity" "is both a closed-and
open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct
that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition." Id. at 241. Closed-ended
continuity could be shown by a "series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of
time," while open-ended continuity can be proved by showing that "the racketeering acts them-
selves include a specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future" or that "the
predicate acts or offenses are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business." Id. at
242. The Court's support for its test was, understandably, weak. The Court adopted what it
termed "a commonsense, everyday understanding of RICO's language and Congress' gloss on it."
Id. at 241. As support for its "continuity" definition, the Court cited Barticheck v. Fidelity Union
Bank/First National State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987). See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241. How-
ever, although the Barticheck court rejected the view that racketeering acts committed pursuant to
a single scheme can constitute a RICO pattern only if the scheme is potentially ongoing or open-
ended, the court "decline[d] to adopt a verbal formula for determining when unlawful activity is
sufficiently extensive to be 'continuous."' Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 40.
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which are found in the text of RICO, in order to find a "pattern of
racketeering."
Paradoxically, although the Court engaged in common law
rulemaking in order to provide definition to "pattern of racketeering,"
the Court criticized the Eighth Circuit's concept of a scheme that it said
"appears nowhere in the language or legislative history of the Act." 1
The Court seemed to recognize, however, that it had started down a
road of common law rulemaking in defining the "pattern of
racketeering" requirement, saying:
[T]he limits of the relationship and continuity concepts that combine
to define a RICO pattern, and the precise methods by which
relatedness and continuity or its threat may be proved, cannot be fixed
in advance with such clarity that it will always be apparent whether in
a particular case a 'pattern of racketeering activity' exists. The
development of these concepts must await future cases, absent a
decision by Congress to revisit RICO to provide clearer guidance as to
the Act's intended scope. 101
In other contexts, where RICO's statutory language provides more
definition, the Supreme Court has been consistently hostile to lower
court efforts to create extra-textual limitations on RICO. The Court has
avoided common law policy analysis in deciding not to create extra-
textual limitations, relying instead on plain meaning principles, and has
rejected any notions that it should engage in common law
rulemaking. 10 2  The Court has often relied on negative inference in
100. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241. Unsurprisingly, earlier courts had interpreted RICO's "pattern
of racketeering activity" requirement differently than the Court's "commonsense, everyday un-
derstanding." Compare United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1988), and United
States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that predicate acts need not
be related to each other to constitute a pattern), with H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829
F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[a] single fraudulent effort or scheme is insufficient"
to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, even if more than two predicate acts were commit-
ted in furtherance of the scheme), rev'd, 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
101. H.J.Inc.,492U.S.at243.
102. The Supreme Court's predilection for using a textualist approach in interpreting RICO
and claiming to adhere to the legislative supremacy approach indicates its unlikeliness of ever
adopting an explicit common law approach, or, for that matter, Kahan's administrative law con-
ception. It should not be too surprising that the Supreme Court relied on a textualist approach in
interpreting RICO. The statutory interpretation approach of textualism has been prominently
used by the Court in recent years and has captured the interest of a wide variety of judges and
legal scholars. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1119 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigo-
rating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY.
L.J. 527 (1998); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673 (1997); Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93 (1995);
Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1057 (1995);
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rejecting efforts to fill in the interstices of RICO through perceived
extra-textual constraints on the scope of the statute. For example, in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,'013 the Court refused to interpret "pattern
of racketeering" to require evidence of a "racketeering injury." The
Court said:
[Given] that 'racketeering activity' consists of no more and no less
than commission of a predicate act, § 1961(1), we are initially
doubtful about a requirement of a racketeering injury separate from
the harm from the predicate acts. A reading of the statute belies any
such requirement .... There is no room in the statutory language for
an additional, amorphous racketeering injury requirement. 104
David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921
(1992); Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 235; Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power
Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585 (1994); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 321 (1995); George H. Taylor, Textualism at Work, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 259 (1995).
It has been documented that since Justice Scalia's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986,
the Court's statutory opinions have more often found a plain meaning, have less often examined
legislative history to confirm the existence of a plain meaning, and, in only a handful of instances,
have relied on legislative history to interpret a statute against what the Court felt was its plain
meaning. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 76, at 624. Four types of justifications for tex-
tualism are usually offered. The first is that all that is "law" is the text actually adopted by the
legislature and presented to the chief executive. See id. The second is that other methodologies
are inconsistent with constitutional norms. See id. Any effort by members or committees of
Congress to influence the interpretation of statutes by signaling their "intent" or "purpose" is in
tension with Article I, section 7 of the United States Constitution's requirement that Congress
cannot legislate without bicameral consensus and presentment of the fruits of that consensus to
the President. See id. Moreover, efforts by courts to interpret statutes by reference to extra-
textual sources is in tension with the separation of powers that is part of Articles I-II of the Con-
stitution. See id. The third is that textualism upholds the "liberal" principles embodied in the
Constitution. See id. By construing statutes narrowly, textualism upholds the Framers' intent
that there be a presumption that people's arrangements would prevail unless expressly displaced
by legal doctrine. See id. The fourth justification for textualism, more normative than the rest, is
"courts should respect legislative supremacy because society will be better off it they do." Ed-
ward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1129, 1132 (1992). The normative argument is based on accountability and majoritarianism. See
id. at 1135. Elected representatives are politically accountable, while judges with life tenure are
not directly accountable in either their appointments or removal. But see Sunstein, supra note 7,
at 418-19 (discussing limitations in textualist approach in distinguishing between original mean-
ings for the enacting legislature and contemporary meanings of statutory language). Regardless
of its arguable limitations in other areas, textualism is a necessary component of the legislative
supremacy model because it allows the courts to give a criminal statute its fair import without
extending its meaning beyond what is clearly expressed in the text of the statute.
103. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
104. Id. at 495. The Court also seemed to accept a common law conception of rulemaking,
saying that "[t]he 'extraordinary' uses to which RICO has been put" are the result of "the failure
of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of pattern." Id. at 500.
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Similarly, in United States v. Turkette,'0 5 the Supreme Court declined
to engage in common law rulemaking. The Court relied on the plain
meaning of the statute and declined to require that the "enterprise"
requirement, defined in § 1961(4),106 be limited to legitimate
enterprises, saying that:
[o]n its face, the definition appears to include both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes criminal
enterprises than it does legitimate ones. Had Congress not intended to
reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep
of the definition by inserting a single word, 'legitimate.' 107
In National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 10 8 the Court again
declined to engage in common law rulemaking and relied instead on the
plain meaning of the statute. In holding that the RICO statute did not
require that the racketeering enterprise harbor, or that the predicate acts
of racketeering spring from an economic motive, the Court said that
nowhere in either § 1962(c) 1°9 or the RICO definitions in § 1961 is
there a requirement of such a motive. 110 The Court said that "Congress
could easily have narrowed the sweep of the term 'enterprise' by
inserting a single word, 'legitimate.''1I
As the aforementioned cases illustrate, the Court's incoherent
jurisprudence in construing RICO has resulted from its refusal to
recognize consistently that Congress delegated lawmaking authority to
construe RICO by leaving key terms undefined."12  The Court has,
except on rare occasions, 113 engaged in a jurisprudence that is not a
common law jurisprudence, but rather a jurisprudence that has been
erroneously identified as a legislative supremacy jurisprudence. Instead
of explicitly recognizing that the statute was left incomplete, the Court
has engaged in a jurisprudence that has construed RICO's terms as
though Congress had enacted complete definitions. 114
105. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
106. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing RICO's definition of "enterprise").
107. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-8 1.
108. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994).
110. See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 249-50.
111. Id. at 260 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581).
112. See Kahan, supra note 58, at 480. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492
U.S. 229 (1989), is one of the few instances where the Court recognized that Congress left some
RICO terms undefined. See id. at 237 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496
n.14 (1985)).
113. See supra notes 91-101 (discussing H.J. Inc. as an instance where the Court seemed to
recognize that it was engaging in common law rule making).
114. See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 252 (holding that a violation of RICO can occur without an
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Because the Court has not recognized that Congress left RICO
undefined, it has also refused to construe RICO as possessing limiting
principles on the ground that recognizing limiting principles would be
equivalent to engaging in de facto lawmaking. 115  The Court's
jurisprudence has resulted in an unpersuasively broad interpretation of
RICO,116 unpersuasive not just because of its broad interpretations,l17
but because of its inadequate justifications for those broad
interpretations. 1
18
Recognizing that the Court's current position is incoherent suggests
that another approach is more appropriate. This Article contends that
the viable choices are the common law and legislative supremacy
methods, 119 and that the legislative supremacy method is far superior.
By approaching the interpretation of RICO using principles of
legislative supremacy that recognize the incompleteness of RICO and
restrict its scope through the rule of lenity120 and the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, 121 the courts could foster a more consistent interpretation of
RICO that would place the onus on Congress to shoulder the
responsibility of criminal-lawmaking.
economic motive, despite little statutory guidance); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-
81 (1981) (holding that the term "enterprise" included both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises
within its scope).
115. See Kahan, supra note 50, at 15 (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 249) ("[I]f the omission of
an organized crime nexus in RICO is a defect.., it is one 'inherent in the statute as written,' and
hence beyond our power to correct"); see also Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 257 ("Nowhere in either §
1962(c) or the RICO definitions in § 1961 is there any indication that an economic motive is re-
quired.").
116. See Alexander M. Parker, Note, Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J.
819, 838 (1996) (stating that the judiciary has interpreted RICO "in its absolute broadest man-
ner").
117. This Article does not argue that RICO's scope should be narrow or that Congress would
want RICO to have a narrow scope. Rather, this Article contends that if RICO's reach is to be
broad, Congress, not the judiciary, should make that determination.
118. As discussed above, in refusing to interpret RICO narrowly, the Court has pointed to
RICO's text and declared that explicit statutory indications of Congress' intent to have RICO in-
terpreted in the suggested narrow manner are absent. This method of looking for limiting princi-
ples to be explicitly stated in the statutory text is often illogical considering that Congress left
RICO's terms undefined, see supra notes 112-14, and delegated the authority to define the terms
to the courts.
119. This Article also acknowledges the existence of a third conception, the administrative
law approach, which Kahan calls "a realizable ideal." See Kahan, supra note 50, at 17. Because,
however, the administrative law approach is unlikely to be implemented, it cannot be considered
a viable option. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the unlikelihood that the
administrative law method will be enacted).
120. See infra Part IV (discussing the role the rule of lenity could play to narrow the scope of
RICO).
121. See infra Part V (analyzing the role of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in narrowing the
scope of ambiguous statutes).
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IV. THE RULE OF LENITY
A. Justification for the Rule of Lenity as a Nondelegation Doctrine
The rule of lenity is an important component of the legislative
supremacy approach. 122 The rule of lenity, one of the oldest canons of
statutory interpretation, 123 dictates that criminal laws must be construed
strictly. If the criminal statute does not clearly outlaw private conduct,
the actor cannot be penalized. 124 The rule of lenity is usually viewed as
a default rule of interpretation, coming into play only when the statute is
ambiguous. 125 The rule requires that the legislature define a crime, and
that the definition be clear before courts may impose punishment.126 If
the legislature drafts the statutory language so that the language clearly
shows the legislative intent for the criminal statute to cover a wide
range of criminal behavior, the statute, consistent with the rule of lenity,
will be read that way.
The doctrine is usually justified as protecting principles of fair
warning and protecting individuals from arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement of criminal statutes.127 Some, however, object that these
traditional justifications are not sufficient to warrant application of the
122. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 205 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In our era of multiplying new federal crimes, there is more reason than ever to give this
ancient canon of construction consistent application: by fostering uniformity in the in-
terpretation of criminal statutes, it will reduce the occasions on which this Court will
have to produce judicial havoc by resolving in defendants' favor a Circuit conflict re-
garding the substantive elements of a federal crime.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998)).
123. One of the first expressions of the strict construction philosophy was expressed by Chief
Justice Marshall:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than
construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individu-
als; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative,
not in the judicial department.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820). Although the rule of lenity is indisputably an
old and established doctrine, critics have been skeptical about whether strict construction and the
rule of lenity are even seriously used. One scholar has said that "[tioday, strict construction sur-
vives more as a makeweight for results that seem right on other grounds than as a consistent pol-
icy of statutory interpretation. Citation to the rule is usually pro forma." Jeffries, supra note 80,
at 198-99; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007, 1083 (1989).
124. See Sachs, supra note 71, at 600.
125. See infra notes 184-210 and accompanying text (discussing when the rule of lenity will
be applied).
126. See Sachs, supra note 71, at 600.
127. See id.
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rule of lenity. 128  One objection, which questions the fair warning
rationale, is that a court should not strictly construe a criminal statute
prohibiting an act that is clearly antithetical to conventional values, such
as one that creates an offense that is malum in se. 129 Invoking the rule
of lenity even for malum prohibitum criminal statutes is not
uncontroversial. Critics doubt whether criminals actually consult
criminal statues before acting. 130  Indeed, critics of the rule of lenity ask
why a serious wrongdoer should get the benefit of the strict-
construction maxim. 131
Although still retaining some persuasive force, notice concerns are
not the main reason why courts should invoke the rule of lenity in
contexts such as RICO. The rule of lenity also serves as a
"nondelegation doctrine."'132 While still concerned with due process,
fair notice, and a "generic bias in favor of liberty," lenity is also
128. See Bryan T. Camp, Dual Construction of RICO: The Road Not Taken in Reves, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 61, 61-62 (1994) (objecting to the rule of lenity in the RICO context);
Shapiro, supra note 102, at 935 (noting that the critics of canons of construction recognize the
value of the rule of lenity in providing fair warning of prohibited conduct, but questioning its
value in cases involving conduct that is malum in se); Solan, supra note 71, at 140 (arguing that
traditional rationales for the rule of lenity do not apply in the RICO context).
129. Justice Holmes made the traditional argument that although notice might be a fiction, it is
important nonetheless:
[A]lthough it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law be-
fore he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to
do if a certain line is passed.
McBoyle v. United States, 282 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
130. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 80, at 219-20 (arguing that, generally, "there is no plausible
suggestion that the actor either knew or cared what the law was").
131. These objections are especially weighty when considering RICO because RICO does not
make previously legal acts criminal, but, instead, creates a new federal criminal statute covering
acts that other criminal statutes have made crimes. Invoking the rule of lenity because of notice
concerns might therefore seem unpersuasive in the RICO context. Because RICO created a new
federal criminal statute covering acts made criminal by other statutes, it seems implausible to
think that courts' broad interpretations of RICO could have subjected anyone who honestly at-
tempted to conform his or her behavior to what he or she believed the criminal law required to
criminal penalties. However, although there are weighty arguments against notice as a rationale
for the rule of lenity in the RICO context, those concerns still have persuasive force. Requiring a
high degree of clarity from the legislature will ensure that potential defendants have notice as to
the scope of a statute and the degree of penalty imposed and will also ensure that the legislature
recognizes the full extent of the consequences it imposes on individuals. While invoking the rule
of lenity may not be completely persuasive in the RICO context to provide notice of prohibited
conduct, it is persuasive when used to put the defendant on notice as to the level of punishment
that is accorded a specific act. See United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
221-22 (1952) (indicating the Court's approval of the rule of lenity when determining the appro-
priate severity of punishment).
132. See Kahan, supra note 52, at 347; see also Eskridge, supra note 123, at 1029 (noting that
the rule of lenity provides separation-of-powers value in addition to a due process value).
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essential to the enforcement of legislative supremacy in federal criminal
law. 133 The Court has asserted that federal criminal law-making power
cannot be delegated, saying that "[b]ecause of the seriousness of
criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents
the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity."'134  When viewed as a nondelegation
principle, the rule of lenity becomes much more persuasive. 135  By
133. See Kahan, supra note 52, at 349-50.
134. United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)). In rejecting the Court's authorization of the use
of legislative history in Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990), Justice Scalia endorsed the
rule of lenity as upholding legislative supremacy, saying that "Moskal's mode of analysis also
disserves the rule of lenity's other purpose: assuring that the society, through its representatives,
has genuinely called for the punishment to be meted out." R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 309 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 951 (1988) (distinguishing be-
tween a degree of uncertainty involved in applying standards and toleration of arbitrariness and
unfairness of standards developed by the judiciary); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213
(1985); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (holding that the rule of lenity strikes
the appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal
liability).
135. See Solan, supra note 71, at 140-41. Professor Solan argues that neither notice nor leg-
islative supremacy "rationales should lead to strict construction of RICO" because RICO has a
liberal construction clause and RICO is a compound criminal statute that criminalizes activities
that are otherwise crimes in any event. Id. First, it is debatable whether the liberal construction
clause applies to the criminal provisions of RICO and, if it does, whether it is constitutionally
congruent with due process principles. See infra note 209 and accompanying text. Moreover,
Solan himself argues that, as a result of ingrained judicial philosophy, courts ignore liberal con-
struction clauses because of the rule of lenity. See Solan, supra note 71, at 122-28. Second, the
fact that RICO is a compound criminal statute does not make lenity inappropriate. Professor So-
Ian shortchanges the nondelegation principle of the rule of lenity. As Chief Justice Marshall
wrote in United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820), "[i]t is the legislature, not the Court,
which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment." Id. at 95. In drafting RICO, Congress left
its terms undefined. See Kahan, supra note 58, at 480. To say that the judiciary should not in-
voke the rule of lenity in this situation is to make a normative argument that the judiciary should
make policy in the criminal-law area. See infra note 136 (discussing the implications on democ-
racy of judicial lawmaking in the criminal context). Solan also ignores the benefits of the rule of
lenity in fostering uniformity in the interpretation of criminal statutes. In situations such as RICO
where statutory terms are left undefined, the rule of lenity provides an a priori principle of inter-
pretation that would foster greater consistency in statutory interpretation. See infra note 153 (dis-
cussing the importance of consistency in statutory interpretation). Also, notice is still important
in the RICO context. See Sachs, supra note 71, at 601 (addressing the rule of lenity as a safe-
guard of the procedural due process right to notice of the type of conduct that can result in crimi-
nal punishment). RICO's possible penalties are often harsher than the penalties for the underly-
ing predicate acts. See United States v. Rainone, 32 F.3d 1203, 1208 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming a
two-level upward departure from the RICO sentencing guidelines). Therefore, the notice ration-
ale is relevant because it puts the defendant on notice as to the level of punishment that is ac-
corded a specific act. Invoking the rule of lenity in federal criminal law will also help promote
federalism. When there is an issue of the scope of a federal criminal statute that potentially cov-
ers activities historically regulated by the states, the courts promote federalism by requiring Con-
gress to be explicit in its desire to regulate areas traditionally under the exclusive control of the
states. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 349 (commenting that "[i]n traditionally sensitive areas, such as
2000] RICO and the Legislative Supremacy Approach
invoking the rule of lenity, courts promote democracy. 136 Justice
Frankfurter equated broad statutory writing and the acceptance of it by
the courts as the equivalent to an undemocratic shift of lawmaking
responsibility to the judiciary:
In a democracy the legislative impulse and its expression should come
from those popularly chosen to legislate, and equipped to devise
policy, as courts are not. The pressure on legislatures to discharge
their responsibility with care, understanding and imagination should
be stiffened, not relaxed. Above all, they must not be encouraged in
irresponsible or undisciplined use of language. 137
Invoking the rule of lenity will discipline Congress to move away
from the public choice theory of legislative enactment 138 toward a more
responsible form of legislative enactment that will force Congress to
tackle the difficult and controversial issues itself.
The use of the rule of lenity in RICO is not to ensure that Congress is
protected from the courts, but rather to ensure that the courts are
legislation affecting the federal balance," requiring Congress to draft clear statutes assures that
the legislature has addressed the issue).
136. Kahan argues that there is no "tension between delegated common lawmaking and de-
mocracy." Kahan, supra note 58, at 484. He argues that "the suggestion that democracy requires
confining criminal law-making authority to Congress rests on a false premise ... that Congress is
perfectly able to satisfy the electorate's demand for criminal law." Id. The position, however,
that democracy requires confining criminal law-making authority to Congress does not rest on the
premise that Congress can satisfy the electorate's demand for criminal law. Rather, it rests on the
premise, stated by Justice Scalia and Justice Frankfurter, that in a democracy "because of the se-
riousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community... legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity."
Id. at 471. Kahan, as he recognizes, assumes that efficiency as a result of delegation "in criminal
law-making is good." Id. at 482 n.81. This, as he also recognizes, is a controversial position.
See id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)). Professor Eskridge has a different take
on the democratic virtues of the rule of lenity than Professor Kahan. See Eskridge, supra note
77, at 413 (commenting that the rule serves the values of protecting people accused of crimes, a
relatively powerless group, and the goal of "injecting due process" into the political process, both
of which are values easily ignored in the legislative process). Kahan also argues that "the sug-
gestion that it is undemocratic for courts to participate in defining the elements of criminal stat-
utes overlooks the role of federal prosecutors" because "[t]hrough the power of initiative, indi-
vidual prosecutors have a vital say in determining the content of incompletely specified statutes."
Kahan, supra note 58, at 485. Of course, although prosecutors obviously initiate criminal pro-
ceedings, they have no more say in the determination of the reach of a statute than do any other
advocates. See Solan, supra note 71, at 130. Moreover, under a legislative supremacy approach,
prosecutors would have the burden of proof in arguing for a broad interpretation of a criminal
statute. See infra notes 177-83 (discussing the burden of proof in relation to the rule of lenity).
137. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
545-47 (1947); see also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65, 108 (1983) (noting that administrators are better equipped to devise policy than are
courts).
138. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing public choice theory).
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protected from Congress. 139 Congress faces few institutional incentives
to produce clear criminal statutes because it is highly risk-averse in
defining crime. 140 Because Congress is interested in broad statutory
coverage to ensure that statutes do not overlook criminal behavior, it
attempts to push the limit of statutory ambiguity allowed by the
courts. 141  As part of the legislative supremacy approach, the rule of
lenity is invoked to ensure that Congress, and not the courts, is the
branch faced with the responsibility of making difficult political choices
and drafting clear criminal statutes.
Professor Kahan, though, argues that "[i]f a court takes seriously the
notion that only Congress can define the elements of crimes, it ought to
view itself as powerless to construct any doctrine that narrows the scope
of such broadly worded statutes." 142  Kahan is partially correct. Broad,
but clear, criminal statutes should not be narrowed by the judiciary.
However, broad, but unclear, statutes are problematic. It is a fallacy
that all broadly worded statutes are intended by Congress to be broadly
construed. 143  The legislative supremacy model acknowledges
Congress' legislative mandate, but insists on clear directives. Congress
is free to enact statutes that cover a broad range of criminal activity, as
long as the scope of the statute is made explicit in the text of the statute.
The rule of lenity, thus, is only invoked in the absence of clear
legislation. In the case of a statute whose scope is unclear, the court has
two options: construe the statute narrowly or construe it broadly. 144
139. See Standen, supra note 23, at 286-87 (arguing that RICO's broad definitions allow
judges and prosecutors to define the law).
140. See id.
141. See id. at 287-88.
142. Kahan, supra note 58, at 480-81. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has, at times, mis-
takenly agreed with those who have taken the position that construing federal statutes as pos-
sessing limiting principles would amount to de facto lawmaking. For example, in H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), the Court said that "[i]f plaintiffs' ability
to use RICO against businesses engaged in a pattern of criminal acts is a defect ... it is one 'in-
herent in the statute as written,' and hence beyond our power to correct." Id. at 249; see also
Carole Golinski, In Protest of NOW v. Scheidler, 46 ALA. L. REV. 163, 171 (1994) (noting that
the Court's application of "classic separation of power arguments" to "justify a liberal interpreta-
tion of the RICO statute" indicates "reluctance to usurp legislative functions"). But see Dowling
v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1985) (applying a narrow interpretation where statutory
language is unclear); Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 400-01 (1980) (stating that courts
must resolve doubt in accord with the rule of lenity and that if the Court's construction of Con-
gress' intent clashes with present legislative expectations, then Congress, not the Courts, must
provide the remedy by amending the statute).
143. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent in
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999)).
144. See supra notes 9 1-101 and accompanying text (discussing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co.).
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Principles of judicial restraint and the historical reluctance of courts to
construe criminal statutes broadly argue for a strict interpretation. 145
Lenity ensures that the expressed intent of the legislature is enforced by
insisting on clear language as a prerequisite to imposing punishment on
defendants. Invoking the rule of lenity avoids judicial
embellishment. 146  "When the legislature fails to speak clearly," the
legislative supremacy model "avoids the dilemma of how to derive a
legitimate interpretation without 'legislating' by choosing a priori the
stance the court" must take-the court must construe the statute
narrowly. 147
B. The Rule of Lenity as a Background Principle of Strict Construction
Determining that the rule of lenity will be used in the interpretive
process does not end the lenity controversy because the manner in
which the rule is considered in the interpretive process determines its
efficacy. 148 In general, the Supreme Court usually only invokes lenity
at the end of the interpretive process. 149 As a result, the Court has held
that the RICO statute is broad but unambiguous and, thus, it does not
require application of the rule of lenity. In rejecting the use of the rule
of lenity in United States v. Turkette1 50 and National Organization for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, the Court said that "the rule of lenity applies
145. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the rule of
lenity).
146. Similar to the de facto lawmaking claim, another criticism of the rule of lenity approach
to federal criminal statutory interpretation may be that it gives one side of the criminal law debate
an unfair advantage in the legislative process. Because those interests in favor of a narrow con-
ception of federal criminal law would know that the courts will interpret criminal statutes with a
presumption of invoking the rule of lenity, they will have an advantage in the legislative process.
Contrary to those claims, however, the legislative supremacy conception as a refusal of courts to
interpret criminal statutes broadly should not be viewed as giving one side an unfair advantage.
Rather, it is a principle of judicial restraint, mandating that the legislature define crime. See Sarah
Newland, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 197, 207 (1994). By using lenity as an interpretive principle that is applied consis-
tently, Congress would be on notice that it must enact clear statutes if it intends that courts inter-
pret them broadly.
147. Id. at 206.
148. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 66 (1993).
149. See Newland, supra note 146, at 204.
150. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the Court added that:
There being no ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue here, the rule of lenity does
not come into play. The canon in favor of strict construction of criminal statutes is not
an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose ....
Nor does it demand that a statute be given the 'narrowest meaning'; it is satisfied if the
words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.
Id. at 587 n.10 (citations omitted).
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only when an ambiguity is present; 'it is not used to beget one .... The
rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what
Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers." '' 15 1
Instead of waiting until the end of the interpretive process to invoke
the rule of lenity, however, courts should use the rule of lenity as both
part of the textualist interpretive process and as a general principle of
strict construction of criminal statutes. 152 This alternative application of
the rule of lenity would promote consistent, restrained judicial
interpretation that, in turn, would drive legislative drafting in the
direction of plain, unmistakable language. 153  The rule of lenity would
foster coherence in legal interpretation by providing a consistent
interpretive framework. Consistent use of the rule of lenity would put
Congress on notice of how to draft its statutes to reach a desired
result. 154 The rule of lenity's principle of strict construction would
guide interpretation of all criminal statutes and would apply the rule of
lenity when the statutory text is ambiguous. 155
151. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 (1994) (quoting Turkette,
452 U.S. at 587-88). The Court added that "[w]e simply do not think there is an ambiguity here
which would suffice to invoke the rule of lenity. The fact that RICO has been applied in situa-
tions not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth." Id. The Supreme Court's refusal to consider applying the rule of lenity until the end of
the interpretive process in RICO cases is consistent with the Court's treatment of lenity in other
contexts. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998) (holding that to invoke the
rule there must be a "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute") (citations omitted); United
States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (indicating that the rule of lenity only applies if the
court can make "no more than a guess as to what Congress intended") (citations omitted); Reno v.
Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 51 (1995) (stating that the rule of lenity applies only if the court can make
"no more than a guess as to what Congress intended") (citations omitted); United States v. Sha-
bani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994) (noting that the rule of lenity applies only when traditional canons of
statutory construction fail to resolve the statutory ambiguity); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223, 239 (1993) (holding that the mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction, how-
ever, does not by itself make the rule of lenity applicable) (citations omitted).
152. See Newland, supra note 146, at 204.
153. See id; see also Sachs, supra note 71, at 622 (commenting on the importance of precise
textual meanings). The Court, at times, has indicated the value of the rule of lenity in promoting
consistency in interpretation. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 951 (1988) (stating,
before the Court applied the rule of lenity, that "it would be quite another thing to tolerate the ar-
bitrariness and unfairness of a legal system in which the judges would develop the standards for
imposing criminal punishment on a case-by-case basis").
154. See Frankfurter, supra note 137, at 545.
155. See Newland, supra note 146, at 206.
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C. The Rule of Lenity Should Trump Use of Legislative History and
Congressional Purpose
Before invoking the rule of lenity, the Court must find that the
statutory language is ambiguous. Obviously, the sources consulted by
the Court to determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous are
critical. 156  Unfortunately, the Court has referred to the legislative
history and "motivating policies" of statutes as part of its interpretive
policy. This is unfortunate because legislative history is unreliable and,
even if it is reliable, courts are institutionally incapable of interpreting
legislative history accurately. 157 Instead, courts should allow the rule of
lenity to trump reference to legislative history and congressional
purpose.
A recent case illustrates the Court's willingness to give a broad and
plain reading of criminal statutes in accord with the Court's treatment of
the RICO statute. In Holloway v. United States,158 the Court considered
156. Professor Solan describes three approaches to the rule of lenity. The first approach de-
veloped in England as a device to thwart the will of a legislature bent on enacting draconian laws.
See Solan, supra note 71, at 87. The second approach, called "The American Tradition of Strict
Construction," was articulated primarily by Chief Justice Marshall. Id. at 89. This approach con-
sisted of the following principles:
(1) criminal statutes are to be strictly construed; (2) vagueness is not to be resolved by
imposing the narrowest reading; rather, the ordinary meaning of the word is to be
gleaned from its context in the statute; and (3) if an activity is not within the plain
meaning of the statute it is not a crime.
Id. at 94. The third approach, the "Narrow Rule of Lenity," was articulated by Justice Frank-
furter. Id. at 102. This approach, which applied to criminal statutes "the meaning that their lan-
guage most obviously invites," added legislative history and other extra textual materials to the
types of information that courts were willing to examine in construing a criminal statute. Id. at
105-07. Professor Solan believes that the Rehnquist Court continues to apply the third, narrow
approach to lenity. See id. at 109.
157. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1862 (1998). Professor Vermeule
offers a persuasive, and relatively unmentioned, criticism of judicial use of legislative history.
Professor Vermeule argues that even if the "[i]ntentionalist claim (I) that judicial resort to legis-
lative history is constitutional; (2) that ascertaining legislative intent is the ultimate object of in-
terpretation; and (3) that legislative history generally provides reliable evidence of intent," they
have not shown "that courts that consult legislative history will produce more accurate determi-
nations of legislative intent than courts that restrict themselves to statutory text and other standard
sources of interpretation." Id. Professor Vermeule's conclusion is that:
[T]he extreme volume and heterogeneity of legislative history interact with structural
constraints of the adjudicative process in ways that make courts systematically prone to
mishandle legislative history and that accordingly create distinctive risks of adjudica-
tive error. Even on intentionalist premises, then, courts should consider curtailing their
use of a source that predictably decreases the accuracy of judicial determinations of
legislative intent over the mn of cases.
Id. at 1896.
158. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999).
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whether a federal statute making it a crime to carjack "with the intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm"'159 could be satisfied if the
defendant possessed "conditional intent" (i.e., intent to cause death or
serious bodily harm only if a condition is met, such as the victim not
cooperating). 160
The Court seemingly began a textualist approach by citing Turkette
for the proposition that "the language of the statutes that Congress
enacts provides 'the most reliable evidence of its intent,"' but instead
attempted to divine the purpose of the statute. 161 The Court determined
that the purpose of "the statute as a whole reflects an intent to authorize
federal prosecutions as a significant deterrent to a type of criminal
activity that was a matter of national concern." 162  Further, the Court
reasoned that because the purpose of the statute is better served by a
broad reading, "the entire statute is consistent with a normal
interpretation of the specific language that Congress chose."' 163 The
Court rejected the application of the rule of lenity, saying that "[w]e
have repeatedly stated that '[t]he rule of lenity applies only if, after
seizing everything from which aid can be derived ... we can make no
more than a guess as to what Congress intended"' and that the result of
its previous analysis required it to make no such guess. 164
Besides disagreeing with the Court's textual analysis, Justice Scalia
disagreed with the Court's interpretation of and reliance on the statute's
purpose. 165 He opposed the Court's view that serving the purpose of the
159. As amended by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, §
60003(a)(14), 108 Stat. 1970, and by the Carjacking Correction Act of 1996, § 2, 110 Stat. 3020,
the statute provides:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle
that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from
the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts
to do so, shall-
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury... results be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years
up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. III 1999).
160. See Holloway, 526 U.S. at 3. The accomplice testified at the trial that the intent was to
"steal the cars without harming the victims, but that he would have used his gun if any of the
drivers had given him a 'hard time."' Id. at 4.
161. Id. at 6.
162. Id. at 9.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 12 n.14 (citations omitted).
165. See id. at 13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia dissented on the basis that "intent" in
the statute could not possibly be broad enough to include "conditional intent" because:
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statute required a broad reading of the statute. He said that
"[1limitations upon the means employed to achieve the policy goal are
no less a 'purpose' of the statute than the policy goal itself."'' 66  But
"[u]nder the Court's analysis, any interpretation of the statute that
would broaden its reach would further the purpose the Court has found.
Such reasoning is limitless and illogical."' 167
The goal of the legislative supremacy conception would be to avoid
the reasoning exhibited in Holloway and in other decisions that broadly
construe RICO. Too often the Court has construed indefinite statutes
broadly on the basis of legislative history and in a misguided belief that
the purpose of the criminal statute could only be served by a broad
interpretation. 1 68
[I]n customary English usage the unqualified word 'intent' does not usually connote a
purpose that is subject to any conditions precedent except those so remote in the
speaker's estimation as to be effectively nonexistent-and it never connotes a purpose
that is subject to a condition which the speaker hopes will not occur.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, intent is "[a] state of mind in which a per-
son seeks to accomplish a given result through a course of action" that cannot be present when the
actor hopes the result required for liability will not ensue. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY).
166. Id. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia said that if he "were to speculate as to the real
reason the 'intent' requirement was added by those who drafted it, [he] would select neither the
Court's attribution of purpose nor [the intent that he] hypothesized." id. at 19 n.2 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia concluded that he thought that "the 'intent' requirement was inadvertently
expanded beyond the new subsection 2119(3), which imposed the death penalty-where it was
thought necessary to ensure the constitutionality of that provision." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
But, according to Justice Scalia, "the actual intent of the draftsmen is irrelevant," only the enacted
text controls. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Justice Scalia found the statute "entirely un-
ambiguous," he noted that "[e]ven if ambiguity existed, [sic] the rule of lenity would require it to
be resolved in the defendant's favor." Id. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia criticized
the Court, saying:
[11f [lenity] is no longer the presupposition of our law, the Court should say so, and re-
duce the rule of lenity to an historical curiosity. But if it remains the presupposition,
the rule has undeniable application in the present case. If the statute is not, as I think,
clear in the defendant's favor, it is at the very least ambiguous and the defendant must
be given the benefit of the doubt.
Id. at 21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also quoted Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955), where Frankfurter said:
When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared
will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this is not out of any
sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in
proscribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of
our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a
harsher punishment.
Holloway, 526 U.S. at 21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell, 349 U.S. at 81).
168. In addition to his concerns about the reliability and appropriateness of judicial resort to
legislative history, Justice Scalia also believes that considering legislative history when inter-
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D. How Much Ambiguity Must a Criminal Statute Possess to Be
Considered Ambiguous?
Even if courts accept the rule of lenity as a background principle of
statutory construction and do not consult legislative history before
invoking the rule, a critical determination in the legislative supremacy
approach the degree of ambiguity a statute must possess in order to
mandate the application of the rule of lenity. 169  The issue should
perhaps be framed as how persuasive the government's broad
interpretation of the statute must be to be accepted as the authoritative
interpretation. 170  In Moskal v. United States, 7 ' the Court said that
preting criminal statutes fails to comport with the fair warning principle of the rule of lenity. In
United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992), a non-RICO case, the Supreme Court discussed the
rule of lenity. Although the Court affirmed that it would use "the venerable rule of lenity" when a
criminal statute was ambiguous, it reserved application "for those situations in which a reasonable
doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the 'language and structure,
legislative history, and motivating policies' of the statute." Id. at 305 (quoting Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985).
In a concurrence, Justice Scalia wrote that it is "not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a
textually ambiguous penal statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history."
R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 307 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued that referring to legislative
history would fail to "provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal." Id. at 309
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427); see also Sachs, supra note 71, at 619
(arguing that because "defendants cannot be presumed to be on notice of information present only
in legislative history. .. courts should resort to lenity instead [of legislative history]"). Justice
Scalia has persuasively echoed this point in other cases. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S.
511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. The Supreme Court says that it will apply the rule of lenity when a statute is ambiguous,
but the Court is not clear as to how persuasive the narrowing definition must be before it becomes
acceptable. See Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316 (1998) (holding that "the rule of lenity
is not invoked by a grammatical possibility"); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138
(1998) (holding that "[t]he simple existence of some statutory ambiguity, however, is not suffi-
cient to warrant application of that rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree") (cita-
tions omitted); Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66 (1997) (holding that "[t]he rule does not
apply... when invoked to engraft an illogical requirement to its text"); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S.
50, 64-65 (1995) (noting that "division of judicial authority over its proper construction" does not
warrant application of lenity) (citations omitted); United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17
(1994) (stating that lenity does not require that Congress explicitly reject petitioner's reading)
(citations omitted); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993) (commenting that "[t]he
rule of lenity 'cannot dictate an implausible interpretation of a statute, nor one at odds with the
generally accepted contemporary meaning of a term"') (citations omitted); Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 107 (1990) (saying that the argument that lenity should be invoked because
it is possible to narrowly construe a statute misconstrues the doctrine); see also Kahan, supra note
52, at 385 (arguing that "[s]tatutory language is 'ambiguous' when [the interpretive] conventions
conflict or point in different directions"); Newland, supra note 146, at 228 (suggesting that
"courts can frame the issue in terms of the plausibility of competing interpretations and the ability
of a particular interpretation to provide future consistency").
170. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (advocating that the burden of persuasion
should be on the government).
171. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990).
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although the touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity,
"[s]tated at this level of abstraction, of course, the rule 'provides little
more than atmospherics, since it leaves open the crucial
question-almost invariably present-of how much ambiguousness
constitutes... ambiguity."'' 1 72 The Moskal Court declared that it would
"[reserve] lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt
persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to 'the
language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies' of
the statute."'' 73
The Moskal Court indicated that an alternative interpretation must
raise a "reasonable doubt" about the broader interpretation. 7 4  This
standard has been subsequently cited by the Supreme Court. 175  The
Supreme Court's conception of what constitutes a "reasonable doubt" in
the lenity context, however, is extremely narrow, requiring that the
alternative interpretation convince the Court that it can make "no more
than a guess" or that there be a "'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty' in
the statute."'' 7
6
The Court's definition of "reasonable doubt" in the rule of lenity
context is inconsistent with the Court's definition of "reasonable doubt"
in other contexts. Previously, the Court has said that "[i]t is plain to us
that the words 'substantial' and 'grave,' as they are commonly
understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for
acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard."' 177  Instead, the Court
should decide that a statute is ambiguous when the government has
failed to show that there is no "reasonable possibility"']78 that the
172. Id. at 108 (quoting United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) (em-
phasis added).
173. Id. (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)).
174. See id.
175. See United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 70 (1994) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the rule of lenity requires an absurd or glaringly unjust result that raises a reasonable
doubt about Congress' intent) (citation omitted); United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305-06
(1992) (commenting that the Court has "always reserved lenity for those situations in which a
reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort 'to the language and
structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute"') (citation omitted); Chapman
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1991) (requiring a "reasonable doubt" before invoking
the rule of lenity).
176. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998).
177. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40 (1990) (per curium) (rejecting a Louisiana jury in-
struction that defined reasonable doubt as "such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty"
and one that "is an actual substantial doubt").
178. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (defining harmless-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard as no "'reasonable possibility' that trial error contributed to the ver-
dict") (citation omitted).
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proffered narrower interpretation is congruent with the language and
structure of the text.179  A "reasonable possibility" exists when the
narrow interpretation is "rational"' 8 ° or "plausible.'' Applying the
rule of lenity when a narrow interpretation is "rational" or "plausible" is
congruent with the historical use of the rule of lenity 182 and would
further the legislative supremacy conception of criminal lawmaking
while setting a standard that would not "automatically permit[] a
defendant to win."' 1
83
179. Although the Court usually does not discuss burdens of proof, the Court has suggested
that the burden of persuasion should be on the government. See Granderson, 511 U.S. at 54.
Placing the burden of proof on the government would comport well with principles of due proc-
ess and judicial restraint.
180. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 (1987) (stating that "when there are two
rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher
only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language").
181. Justice Thomas has suggested that if the narrower interpretation is plausible, the rule of
lenity should be invoked. See Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 319 (1998) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). Thomas argued that "[a]t the very least, this interpretation is a plausible one ... [and]
must therefore apply .... But the alleged ambiguity does not result from a mere grammatical
possibility; it exists because of an interpretation that ... both accords with a natural reading of the
statutory language and is consistent with the statutory purpose." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy has suggested essentially the same standard. See Evans v. United States, 504
U.S. 255, 273 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that when the court is left with two quite
plausible interpretations, "the rule of lenity requires that [the Court] avoid the harsher one"). Jus-
tice Ginsburg has suggested that the rule should be applied when the government's position is not
decisively clear. See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "Section
924(c) (1)... is not decisively clear").
182. In United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820), Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
[T]hough penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly
as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is not to be so applied
as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in
their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used
them, would comprehend. The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the
words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction.
18 U.S. 76, 95-96 (1820). Applying the narrowest plausible interpretation is consistent with this
statement. The Court is correct that courts should not apply the narrowest possible interpretation.
Rather, courts should apply the narrowest plausible interpretation. In Wiltberger, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote that the Court realized that the narrower interpretation of the statute was probably
not the interpretation that Congress intended. See id. at 105. Nonetheless, he stated,
But probability is not a guide which a court, in construing a penal statute, can safely
take. We can conceive no reason why other crimes which are not comprehended in
this act, should not be punished. But Congress has not made them punishable, and this
Court cannot enlarge the statute.
Id.
183. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139. The Court has warned that it will not adopt a rule of lenity
that would effectively allow a criminal defendant to always prevail. See id.
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E. Application of the Rule of Lenity to RICO
If the Court had invoked the rule of lenity in the RICO context, the
results would have been different, and preferable. For example, in
National Organization of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,184 with an analysis
guided by the rule of lenity, 185 the Court would have limited the
definition of "enterprise," as defined in § 1961(4),186 to include only
enterprises with an economic motive. 187
The definition of "enterprise" contained in § 1961(4)188 is the key to
whether RICO enterprises must have an economic motive. 189 Similar to
184. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994). As with many of the
other Supreme Court opinions construing RICO, Scheidler also resulted in many law review arti-
cles debating its merits. Compare Jennifer G. Randolph, RICO-The Rejection of an Economic
Motive Requirement, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1189, 1189 (1995) (agreeing with Court's
decision but not its reasoning), and Michael Vitiello, Has the Supreme Court Really Turned
RICO Upside Down?: An Examination of NOW v. Scheidler, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1223 (1995) (agreeing with the Court's decision), and Jennifer Bullock, Note, National Organi-
zation for Women v. Scheidler: RICO and the Economic Motive Requirement, 26 CONN. L. REV.
1533, 1535 (1994) (same), with Golinski, supra note 142, at 164 (contending that the Court's de-
cision was an assault on free speech), and Matthew C. Blickensderfer, Note, Unleashing RICO,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867, 867 (1994) (disagreeing with the Scheidler Court's decision).
185. As discussed earlier, the rule of lenity militates against any attempt to divine a criminal
statute's motivating policies from legislative history in order to support a broad interpretation of
the statute. See supra Part IV.C. Instead, the rule requires that the meaning of the statute be de-
rived from its text, and because it is a criminal statute, that the text be strictly construed. See So-
Ian, supra note 71, at 83-86.
186. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994). Each of RICO's prohibited activities in § 1962 requires
that the pattern of racketeering activity have some connection to an "enterprise." Because of the
undefined nature of § 1961(4), courts have been forced into the common law conception to define
the "enterprise" requirement. The Eight Circuit, for example, has construed the "enterprise" re-
quirement to require three elements: "(1) a common purpose; (2) a formal or informal organiza-
tion of the participants in which they function as a unit ('some continuity of both structure and
personality'); and (3) 'an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a
pattern of racketeering activity."' United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1520 (8th Cir. 1995).
187. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "RICO requires either an economically
motivated enterprise or economically motivated predicate acts." National Org. for Women, Inc.
v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 510 U.S. 249 (1994). In addition to the
Seventh Circuit, other circuits adopted the view that RICO enterprises must have economic moti-
vation. See United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that "enterprise," though
more broad than "business," "is an organized profit-seeking venture"). In United States v. Ba-
garic, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), however, "the court later held that "the Government may meet
its obligation to show 'financial purpose' through either the enterprise or the predicate acts of
racketeering." Id. at 56; see also United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding that the term enterprise requires "an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose
of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal"). But see Northeast Women's Ctr.,
Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349-50 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that because the predicate
offense did not require an economic motive, RICO required no additional economic motive).
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
189. In its analysis of whether an enterprise must possess an economic motive, the Supreme
Court analyzed the definition of enterprise in § 1961(4) in a very cursory manner, merely analo-
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the definition of "pattern of racketeering," the definition provided in
§ 1961(4) is explicitly incomplete and provides only hints to its
meaning rather than a complete definition. 190 The definition merely
describes the forms that "enterprises" may take without ascribing any
defining characteristics to those forms.' 91 Because Congress never
attempted to provide a complete definition of "enterprise" in § 1961(4),
resort to other textualist devises is necessary in order to construe a
plausible definition.
An examination of various dictionaries, however, reveals that the
term "enterprise" has multiple definitions. 192  The term typically
gizing to Turkette and, instead, focused more on the operative language of § 1962 in its attempt to
define "enterprise." See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 260-61. This is likely because RICO's definition
of enterprise is relatively unhelpful in trying to decide whether construing RICO's "enterprise"
concept as containing limiting principles is appropriate. See infra note 195 (discussing possible
meanings of "enterprise" through an examination of RICO's legislative history). Nevertheless,
conducting a close analysis of § 1961(4) would have been appropriate.
190. The word "includes" in § 1961(4) is similar to the "requires at least" language in §
1961(5). In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), the Supreme
Court noted that the "requires at least" language in § 1961(5) is different than "other provisions in
§ 1961 that tell us what various concepts used in the Act 'mean."' Id. at 237.
191. See Kahan, supra note 52, at 379. Kahan states,
In truth, the statutory 'definition' of 'enterprise' is no definition at all, but only a direc-
tive to courts not to limit 'enterprise' to the formally structured entities that it com-
monly denotes-such as corporations, partnerships, or associations. But beyond con-
veying that 'enterprise' is not merely one of these entities, the statute affords no clue as
to what else an enterprise is (and, more importantly, is not). That task necessarily falls
upon the courts.
Id.
192. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 418-19 (noting that instructing courts to rely on the plain
meanings of a statute's words "is unhelpful when statutory words have more than one dictionary
definition, or when the context produces interpretive doubt"); see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of
the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 275 (1998) (criticizing
the Supreme Court's use of dictionaries in its opinions). Professor Aprill argues that dictionaries
may be unreliable, in part, because the legal sense of ordinary words may be absent from general
dictionaries and because dictionaries offer a range of meanings for most words. See id. at 298.
Professor Aprill also argues that "Uludges need to resist basing statutory interpretation on the
precise words a particular dictionary uses for one meaning of a word." Id. at 299. Professor
Aprill, however, does see a role for dictionaries in defining statutory language; she envisions a
more limited role where the "dictionary definition becomes a resource in developing the judicial
conception of a statute's interpretation." Id. at 331. The Court's use of a dictionary has some-
times been called a "denotative approach to plain meaning: Apply the dictionary definition and
see if it fits." ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 76, at 588. According to Eskridge & Frickey,
professional linguists do not approach meaning this way. See id. In fact, many reject the insis-
tence that a statute has a "plain meaning." See id. Because words reflect categories that are
"fuzzy at the margins," linguists are willing to expand and contract the meaning of a word beyond
its dictionary definitions. Id. Although the proper weight to give to dictionary definitions is a
matter of dispute, when Congress fails to completely define an important word in a statute, con-
sulting a dictionary is indispensable. Moreover, the Supreme Court does not stop at the diction-
ary definition of a word, but also analyzes its use in the context of the statute. See infra note 206
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includes a business or commercial reference, but also can refer to a
"goal-oriented" entity. 193  The list of examples in § 1961(4) that
constitute enterprises do not mandate that the definition of "enterprise"
be interpreted broadly to include "goal oriented" entities without an
economic motivation. Because the list includes entities that obviously
imply a commercial orientation, such as "partnership" and
"corporation" and because the rest are not inconsistent with a
commercial orientation, adopting the business or commercial
motivation dictionary definition of "enterprise" is consistent with the
language of § 1961(4). 194 Because the definition of "enterprise" as an
entity with an economic motivation is both commonly accepted, as well
as plausible and congruent with RICO's incomplete definition in §
1961(4), applying the rule of lenity's principle of strict construction
would dictate that the narrower definition of "enterprise" prevail, unless
contextual evidence shows that defining "enterprise" to include only
entities with an economic entity would conflict with the purpose of the
statute and hence be implausible. No other evidence, however,
indicates that it would be implausible to define "enterprise" as an entity
with an economic motivation. 
195
& accompanying text (illustrating how the Court looks for the meaning of a statutory term in the
context of the statute).
193. See Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561,
1618-19 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993)). The
authors provide nine dictionary definitions for "enterprise." Six of the definitions include refer-
ences to economic activity. The American Heritage Illustrated Encyclopedic Dictionary defines
enterprise as a "[c]ommercial economic activity; business: private enterprise" and also "[a] busi-
ness or company." Id. at 1618. Funk & Wagnalls New "Standard" Dictionary of the English
Language defines enterprise as "[t]he act of engaging, or the disposition to engage, in difficult
undertakings; boldness, energy, and invention exhibited in practical affairs, especially in busi-
ness." Id. The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary defines enterprise as a "business firm."
See id. The Random House Dictionary of English Language defines enterprise as "a company
organized for commercial purposes; business firm." Id. at 1618-19. The World Book Dictionary
defines enterprise as "[tlhe carrying on of enterprises; a taking part in enterprises." Id. at 1619.
Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines enterprise as " a
unit of economic organization or activity (as a factory, a farm, a mine); esp: a business organiza-
tion: FIRM, COMPANY." Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 531 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
enterprise as "[a] business venture or undertaking").
194. See Blickensderfer, supra note 184, at 874 (stating that "individual" could refer to a sole
proprietorship, and union or "groups of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity"
could refer to organized crime).
195. As discussed above, legislative history is unreliable and its unreliability is evident when
utilized to illuminate the definition of "enterprise." See supra notes 156-68 and accompanying
text. As is usual when construing RICO, there is considerable disagreement about Congress' ob-
jectives in defining "enterprise." Compare Blickensderfer, supra note 184, at 879-83 (arguing
that RICO's legislative history overwhelmingly supports an economic requirement), and Neil
Feldman, Spiraling Out of Control: Ramifications of Reading RICO Broadly, 65 DEF. COUNS. J.
116, 118 (1998) (contending that "there was never an indication that RICO was to extend even
200]
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The operative criminal provisions in §§ 1962(a), 196 (b), 1 97 and (C)19 8
in which the term "enterprise" is used do not mandate a broader
definition. The term "enterprise" plays an important role in subsections
(a), (b), and (c) of § 1962.'99 The dominant theme of § 1962(a), which
prohibits the use or investment of income received from racketeering
activity "in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise" and which contains language referring to
the purchase of securities, is a prohibition against investment in
commercial entities. 2°° Similarly, § 1962(b), which prohibits acquiring
or maintaining any interest in or control of a RICO enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity, also has as its dominant theme the
prohibition of racketeers involvement in commercial entities. Although
the context of § 1962(c), unlike subsections (a) and (b), by itself may
not support the conclusion that the enterprise be a "profit-seeking"
minimally beyond the scope of economically induced crimes"), with Randolph, supra note 184, at
1216-19 (positing that RICO's legislative history does not support an economic requirement). To
the extent that legislative history is relevant in determining whether an economic requirement is a
reasonable interpretation of the RICO statute, RICO's legislative history confirms that an eco-
nomic requirement is a reasonable interpretation. The statements of findings and purpose pre-
ceding the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 are devoted exclusively to organized crime and
focus on its tendency to "derive[] a major portion of its power through money." Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 922-923 (1970). Likewise, the House
and Senate Reports focused on the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racket-
eering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce. See S. REP. No. 91-617, at
76 (1969); H. REP. No. 91-1549, at 57 (1970). Although the legislative history does not clearly
show that RICO requires an economic motive, it certainly does not clearly show the opposite.
One common and misleading objection is that, "if Congress had desired an economic motive re-
striction on the term 'enterprise' it could easily have included one" and that while "[i]n the Senate
proceedings prior to the enactment of RICO ... the Senators used the term 'business enterprise,'
or 'business,"' the text merely uses the word "enterprise." Randolph, supra note 184, at 1217.
The point that if Congress desired an economic motivation it would have explicitly stated so (also
mentioned in Scheidler) is misleading when one considers that Congress did not give a definition
for "enterprise." See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. Contrary to the Supreme
Court's assertions, incomplete statutory language should not automatically be construed as
breadth. Also, the fact that the Senate used the terms "business enterprise" and "business" sup-
ports an economic requirement. Likely, the Senate dropped these terms because it did not want
RICO "enterprises" to be limited to traditional businesses, not because it did not intend for there
to be an economic motivation requirement.
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994).
197. See id. § 1962(b).
198. See id. § 1962(c). National Organization of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249
(1994), involved an action under § 1962(a), (c), and (d). See id. at 252.
199. The Supreme Court has said that it starts with the language of the statute but "consider[s]
not only the bare meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory
scheme." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995).
200. Blickensderfer, supra note 184, at 876 (arguing that it is impossible to acquire an interest
in a non-commercial entity).
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entity, it certainly does not mandate a broader conception of
"enterprise." 201
In Scheidler, the Supreme Court said that:
[t]he phrase "any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce" comes the closest of any
language in subsection (c) to suggesting a need for an economic
motive. Arguably an enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce would have a profit-seeking motive, but the language in §
1962(c) does not stop there; it includes enterprises whose activities
"affect" interstate or foreign commerce .... An enterprise surely can
have a detrimental influence on interstate or foreign commerce
without having its own profit-seeking motives. 202
The Supreme Court's assertion that the word "affect" in § 1962(c)
was intended to broaden "engaged in interstate or foreign commerce" is
hardly as self-evident as the Court suggests. More likely, the phrase "or
the activities of which affect" was intended to satisfy the Commerce
Clause while still covering intrastate economic activity.20 3 The phrase
"affect interstate commerce" is the standard that courts use in
determining whether intrastate activity falls within the Commerce
Clause. 20 4 Moreover, other criminal provisions that clearly only relate
to enterprises having a profit motive use the language.20 5
201. Section 1961(4) provided a single definition of "enterprise," a definition that applies to
all of RICO's subsections. See id. at 875-76. If one were to define "enterprise" as requiring an
economic motive in § 1962(a), it would be illogical, without explicit direction from Congress, to
construe the "enterprise" as not requiring an economic motivation in § 1962(b) or (c). See id. at
876-77.
202. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 257-58.
203. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the same phrase "engaged in, or the activi-
ties of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce" is included in all three subsections of § 1962,
the first of which clearly refers exclusively to commercial based organizations.
204. See, e.g., United States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975)
(holding that "the phrase 'engaged in commerce' as used in § 7 of the Clayton Act ... means en-
gaged in the flow of interstate commerce and was not intended to reach all corporations engaged
in activities subject to the federal commerce power"); Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d
1050, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing "three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its Court-defined Commerce Clause authority") (citation omitted); United States v.
Hornbeck, 489 F.2d 1325, 1326 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that "Congress may impose criminal
sanctions for the purpose of regulating purely intrastate activities which substantially affect inter-
state commerce").
205. For example, § 1956(c)(4), which prohibits money laundering, provides:
the term "financial transaction" means (A) a transaction which in any way or degree af-
fects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or
other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or (iii) involving the
transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or (B) a transaction in-
volving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, in any way or degree.
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Analysis of § 1961(4)'s "enterprise" requirement suggests that the
definition is, at worst, ambiguous. Interpreting "enterprise" as
including an economic motivation is a plausible definition and,
therefore, the rule of lenity dictates that the Court should adopt the
narrower interpretation.20
6
Contrary to the fears of some members of the Supreme Court, the
application of the rule of lenity would not mean that the defendant
always wins under the legislative supremacy approach. 20 7 For example,
the rule of lenity would not change the Court's holding that a RICO
"enterprise" does not have to be a legitimate organization. 20 8  Although
taking interpretive precedence over recourse to any nontextual sources,
such as legislative history, that purport to prove congressional purpose,
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (1994).
206. Interpreting "enterprise" to include an economic motive should not be considered judicial
engrafting of a requirement not found in the statutory language. Rather, the process is merely an
attempt to find the ordinary meaning of the statutory language in its textual context. See Chisom
v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated:
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language in
a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and
second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indica-
tion that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612,
629 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating "[i]n this case we do not believe we are adding elements to the of-
fense, but merely fleshing out the definitions of those elements"), rev'd, 510 U.S. 249 (1994). Of
course, there is a fine line between "fleshing out" the definitions of elements and engaging in
common law rulemaking. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 612 (1995) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("But 'exercising restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute' (which is
what the rule of lenity requires), is quite different from importing extratextual requirements in
order to limit the reach of a federal criminal statute, which is what the Court has done here.")
(citation omitted).
207. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998).
208. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981). Professor Solan believes that
the Court in Turkette could have held that "enterprise" is limited only to legitimate organizations.
See SOLAN, supra note 148, at 79 (arguing that "enterprise" is understood to include only legiti-
mate businesses). Solan does not, however, explain in any detail how the term "enterprise" can
be reasonably limited to legitimate enterprises. In Turkette, the First Circuit rested much of its
argument on its view that "[elach specific enterprise enumerated in § 1961(4) is a legitimate one."
United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). As the Supreme
Court in Turkette noted, however:
The mere fact that a given enterprise is favored with a legal existence does not prevent
that enterprise from proceeding along a wholly illegal course of conduct. Therefore,
since legitimacy of purpose is not a universal characteristic of the specifically listed
enterprises, it would be improper to engraft this characteristic upon the second cate-
gory of enterprises.
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 582 n.4. Further, it is not reasonable, as the Court noted, that §§ 1962(a)-(b)
"were not also aimed at preventing racketeers from investing or reinvesting in wholly illegal en-
terprises and from acquiring through a pattern of racketeering activity wholly illegitimate enter-
prises such as an illegal gambling business or a loan-sharking operation." Id. at 584-85.
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the rule would only be applied when a narrower interpretation of the
statute is plausible. 209 Interpreting RICO in this manner would improve
the consistency of federal law and would force Congress to write better
statutes.
210
209. One objection to the legislative supremacy conception in the RICO context is that RICO
contains a liberal construction clause in § 904(a). Critics of applying RICO's liberal construction
clause in criminal contexts, however, argue that "[t]he fundamental principle of statutory con-
struction is the due process requirement that criminal statutes be construed in favor of lenity ....
If the liberal construction clause is applicable to determine the scope of criminal liability under
[RICO], the provision is therefore unconstitutional." Tarlow, supra note 23, at 309; see also Jer-
emy M. Miller, RICO and Conspiracy Construction: The Mischief of the Economic Model, 104
COM. L.J. 26, 51 (1999) (arguing that the liberal construction clause violates due process and the
separation of powers). At least one court has agreed that the liberal construction clause is not
applicable in criminal contexts. See United States v. McClendon, 712 F. Supp. 723, 729 (E.D.
Ark. 1988). The court wrote that "Congress' call for a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate
the Act's remedial purposes does not outweigh the Court's duty under the rule of lenity to con-
strue criminal statutes strictly." Id. The Supreme Court may agree that the liberal construction
clause does not apply to the criminal provisions of RICO. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479 (1985), the Supreme Court said that:
The strict- and liberal-construction principles are not mutually exclusive; § 1961 and §
1962 can be strictly construed without adopting that approach to § 1964(c) [a civil
RICO provision]. Indeed, if Congress' liberal-construction mandate is to be applied
anywhere, it is § 1964(c), where RICO's remedial purposes are most evident.
Id. at 492 n.10 (citation omitted). Although the Court suggested that RICO's liberal construction
clause might not be applicable to criminal applications of RICO, the Court's language was enig-
matic and cannot be considered conclusive. See SOLAN, supra note 148, at 80 (noting that the
Court's narrow interpretation of § 1962 and its broad interpretation of § 1964 "is a mystery that
the Court does not address, much less solve"). Also complicating matters is that § 904(a) states
that RICO should be interpreted "liberally to effect its remedial purposes," which implies that the
statute should be allowed a broad construction only when doing so would further the remedial
purposes of the statute, a proposition that is subject to dispute considering that the "remedial pur-
poses" of RICO are subject to much debate. 18 U.S.C. § 904(a) (1994); see, e.g., United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1370 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that "enterprise" required an economic
motivation and stating that "[flurthermore, an expansive definition of the term 'enterprise' will
not necessarily effectuate the remedial purpose of RICO to eliminate the infiltration of racketeers
into our business economy").
210. Although reaching the correct result in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993), the
Court's reasoning would have been far more persuasive, and could have improved the consis-
tency of federal law, if it had invoked the rule of lenity. In Reves, the Court was faced with the
task of defining § 1962(c)'s requirement that the defendant "conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs." Id. at 177. The Court noted that the word
"conduct" was used twice in § 1962(c) and said that it was reasonable to give each use a similar
construction. See id. The Court used Webster's Third New International Dictionary to define
"conduct," as a verb, to mean "to lead, run, manage or direct." Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 476 (1976)). The Court argued that conduct must require an
element of direction because, otherwise, the second use of the word becomes superfluous. See id.
at 178. The Court concluded that "[i]n order to 'participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs,' one must have some part in directing those affairs." Id. at 179. The
Court averred that the language of the statute is clear from its language and legislative history and
that its interpretation of "participate" is the commonly understood definition. See id. As the dis-
sent pointed out, the Supreme Court engaged in dictionary shopping and "[w]hat strikes the Court
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V. THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND THE LEGISLATIVE
SUPREMACY APPROACH
Although the rule of lenity is a major component of the legislative
supremacy conception, there are instances where federal criminal
statutes may be so lacking in minimal guidelines that the judiciary
should not attempt to provide definition, but, instead, should strike the
statute down under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Under the
legislative supremacy approach of federal criminal law, an
indispensable requirement of the unconstitutionally vague doctrine is
that criminal statutes provide sufficient "guidance" not only to those
who must obey the laws but also to those who must interpret the laws.
When a statute is too vague to provide sufficient guidance, the judiciary
is placed in the position of usurping the proper function of the
legislature by "making the law" rather than interpreting it.211
Traditionally, vagueness212 may invalidate a criminal law for either
of what the Supreme Court has termed two "independent" reasons. 213
First, the statute "may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable
ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits." 214  Second,
as clear, however, looks at the very least hazy to me." Id. at 187-88 (Souter, J., dissenting). For
criticism of the Court's decision, see Camp, supra note 128, at 77-80; Ira H. Raphaelson & Mi-
chelle D. Bernard, RICO and the "Operation or Management" Test: The Potential Chilling Effect
on Criminal Prosecutions, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 669, 690-95 (1994). The Reves majority decided
that "[blecause the meaning [of] the statute is clear," they did not need "to consider the applica-
tion of the rule of lenity," but that the court would favor the narrower "operation or management"
test that the Court adopted. Reves, 507 U.S. at 184 n.8. The majority would have been better off
honestly conceding that its interpretation of § 1962(c) was only a plausible interpretation, and not
the only reasonable interpretation, and invoking the rule of lenity to mandate the narrower inter-
pretation.
211. See Jeffries, supra note 80, at 202-05 & n.40 (discussing how separation of powers justi-
fies various methods of statutory interpretation).
212. The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a component of the Fifth Amendment, which pro-
vides that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Commentators have noted that courts applying the unconstitution-
ally vague doctrine often do not articulate clearly the underlying rationale and, similar to the rule
of lenity, do not apply the doctrine consistently. See Robert D. Luskin, Behold, the Day of Judg-
ment: Is the RICO Pattern Requirement Void for Vagueness, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 779, 782-83
(1990); Jeffrey I. Tilden, Note, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry Into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REV. 1543,
1551-52 (1981) (noting that vagueness jurisprudence is characterized by inconsistency and lack
of semantic analysis). Professor Batey has argued that courts calculate the importance of a statute
and allow more ambiguity if they believe that the criminal statute is sufficiently important. See
Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes-Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 12 (1997). Consequently, important criminal statutes such as RICO may be
allowed more vagueness than other less important criminal statutes. See id.
213. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (1999).
214. Id. The Supreme Court has said that the fair notice principle bars enforcement of "a stat-
ute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
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the statute "may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. ' 215 Like the rule of lenity,216 the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is viewed, in part, as a nondelegation doctrine. The
Supreme Court has said that "the more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other principal element
of the doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement.' 217  In explaining why vague
statutes that do not establish minimal guidelines "offend several
important values," the Court has warned that "[a] vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." 218
The minimal guidelines concern has been viewed as an independently
sufficient basis for striking down a law on vagueness grounds. In City
of Chicago v. Morales,219 the Supreme Court struck down Chicago's
gang loitering ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance failed to
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement, even though
the Court, arguably, found that the ordinance provided adequate notice
to offenders. 220  Although Justice Stevens' plurality opinion found the
statute invalid because it failed to provide adequate notice, 221 he
commented that "[v]agueness may invalidate a criminal law for either
of two independent reasons." 222
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." United States
v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)).
215. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1859 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
216. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the rule of lenity as a nondelegation doctrine).
217. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
218. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1973); see also Goguen, 415 U.S. at
575 (noting that legislatures abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal
law when they allow standardless sweeps).
219. City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
220. See id. at 1861-63.
221. See id. at 1861.
222. Id. at 1859 (emphasis added). Both Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg joined Justice
Stevens in the plurality. Moreover, Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer explicitly stated in con-
currences that their concurrences were based on the theory that the ordinance was unconstitution-
ally vague because it lacked minimal guidelines. Justice O'Connor stated that the minimal
guidelines concept "alone provides a sufficient ground" for invalidating a statute. Id. at 1864
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated, "I believe this ordinance is unconstitutional,
not because it provides insufficient notice, but because it does not provide 'sufficient minimal
standards to guide law enforcement officers."' Id. at 1866 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Al-
fred Hill, Vagueness and Police Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog, 51 RUTGERS L. REV.
1289 (1999) (agreeing that the Court held that the minimal guidelines concept was held to be an
independent basis for invalidation). Professor Hill believes that the Supreme Court's opinions in
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The Court, at times, has extended to the judiciary the philosophy of
the void-for-vagueness as a nondelegation, minimal guidelines doctrine.
Although the Court has often emphasized notice and arbitrary
enforcement, it has also mentioned, though not nearly as often, the
importance of clear criminal statutes in guiding and constraining the
judiciary.223  Nevertheless, concerns that vague laws delegate excessive
power to the Judicial Branch are as important as concerns that vague
criminal laws delegate excessive enforcement discretion to the
Executive Branch.224
In order for the void-for-vagueness doctrine to serve a nondelegation
purpose in the legislative supremacy approach, an important principle is
that vague criminal statutes, even ones that do not infringe on
constitutionally protected rights, be subject to facial challenges. 225
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), and Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352
(1983), support the Morales Court's holding that the minimal guidelines concept is an independ-
ently sufficient grounds for invalidation. See Hill, supra, at 1309-10. But see The Supreme
Court-Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200, 280 n.52 (1999) (commenting that the holdings of
the six Justices "are consistent with the proposition that notice and discretion moved as one in
vagueness doctrine").
223. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. The Court noted that:
Our concern for minimal guidelines finds its roots as far back as our decision in United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875): "It would certainly be dangerous if the legis-
lature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the
courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative branch of
government."
Id. at 358 n.7; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 n.5 (1997) (stating "the fair
warning requirement also reflects the deference due to the legislature"); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984) (holding that the vagueness doctrine permits meaningful judi-
cial review); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (stating that "a law fails to
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves
judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what
is not in each particular case"); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 495 (1948) (holding that
guessing at Congress' intent is a task outside the bounds of judicial interpretation); Musser v.
Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948) (stating that "[Il]egislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause
because it fails to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defen-
dants of the nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying those
who are accused").
224. See Luskin, supra note 212, at 781 (suggesting that vague criminal statutes that delegate
excessive power "implicate Article Ill's separation of powers concerns").
225. Allowing facial challenges to federal criminal statutes is important under a legislative
supremacy approach because under an "as-applied" vagueness challenge, if a court finds a law
partially vague, the statute cannot be applied to that particular defendant, but it remains intact.
See Michael S. Kelley, "Something Beyond": The Unconstitutional Vagueness of RICO's Pattern
Requirement, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 331, 371 (1991). Some may object to allowing facial chal-
lenges because the Supreme Court has said that it must construe congressional enactments so as
to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 623 (1954).
The Court, however, has indicated that the principle of construing federal statutes so as to avoid a
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not been inclined to strike down
vague federal criminal statutes, especially on facial challenges. 226
Generally, vagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment
freedoms are examined in light of the facts of the case at hand and are
not deemed to warrant facial challenges. 227 The Court has said that the
danger of unconstitutionality is not unlimited. See id.; see also United States v. Powell, 423 U.S.
87, 94 (1975); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Chal-
lenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's distinction between as-applied and facial challenges). Dorf notes that as-applied chal-
lenges violate the principle that "a litigant has always had the right to be judged in accordance
with a constitutionally valid rule of law." Dorf, supra, at 242 (quoting Henry Paul Monaghan,
Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3).
226. The Court has said that it expresses less tolerance for vagueness in criminal rather than
civil statutes because the consequences of imprecision in criminal statutes are qualitatively more
severe. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358-59 n.8 (stating that "where a statute imposes criminal pen-
alties, the standard of certainty is higher"); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982). The Court, however, has said that a strong presumption of validity
attaches to acts of Congress. See United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32
(1963). The Court is far more apt to strike down state, rather than federal, statutes because once a
state statute has been construed by that state's highest court, there is little the United States Su-
preme Court can do to save it. Federal statutes, however, can be construed by the Court in such a
way as to make them constitutional. See A.G.A., Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 83 n.80 (1960). There are several other areas where the
Court has relaxed its vagueness standard. The Court has relaxed vagueness standards where the
statutory terms at issue have a well-established common law meaning. See Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The Court has asserted that "economic regulation is sub-
ject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow and because
businesses ... can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action." Hoffman
Estates, 455 U.S. at 498. The Court has also said that "the constitutionality of a vague statutory
standard is closely related to whether [the] standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea."
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394 (1979); see also Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1858 (holding that
the ordinance was subject to a facial challenge because it did not contain a mens rea requirement)
(plurality opinion). In RICO, Congress did not explicitly include a mens rea requirement and
some have concluded that RICO has no mens rea requirement beyond that necessary for the
predicate acts. See United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995); Miller, supra note
209, at 26, 27 n.6 (noting that, arguably, all but the non-conspiracy clause of RICO may be sub-
ject to strict liability).
227. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988) (concluding that "Iv]agueness
challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests [are judged] on an as applied
basis") (citations omitted); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (stating that "a person
to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground
that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court")
(citations omitted); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (holding that "vagueness
challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light
of the facts of the case at hand") (citations omitted). This approach by the Supreme Court is con-
trary to the traditional mode of vagueness adjudication. See Hill, supra note 222, at 1292-96.
Professor Hill argues that "[uinder traditional vagueness practice, a statute would be invalidated
for vagueness although not vague in all possible applications." Id. at 1290. Professor Hill claims
that Parket v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), was the first case to hold that "one who has received
fair notice can never attack a statute for vagueness." Id. at 1297. The Court, however, did so on
the basis of a misinterpretation of an earlier case, United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.,
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rationale for not allowing a defendant to facially challenge a statute
when that defendant's conduct is clearly prohibited under the statute is
evident: "to sustain a challenge, the complainant must prove that the
ordinance 'is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform
his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but
rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all."' 228
Congruent with this standard, however, the Court, in United States v.
Powell,229 said that even a federal criminal statute 230 that does not
implicate First Amendment rights can be dealt with generally if the
statute proscribes "no comprehensible course of conduct at all."23'
Such a statute "may not constitutionally be applied to any set of
facts. ' 232
372 U.S. 29 (1963). See Hill, supra note 222, at 1297 (arguing that "the Court worked a major
revolution in the disposition of vagueness challenges" when deciding National Dairy Products
Corp.). In Morales, the Court debated whether the ordinance at issue was susceptible to a facial
challenge. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion allowed a facial challenge and said that "even if an
enactment does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, it may be
impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that are suffi-
cient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests." Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1857
(citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 352). Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, believed that a facial
challenge was appropriate because "[t]he ordinance is unconstitutional, not because a policeman
applied this discretion wisely or poorly in a particular case, but rather because the policeman en-
joys too much discretion in every case." Id. at 1866 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, in a
dissent, took strong exception to the Court's view that a facial challenge was appropriate, saying
that "[w]hen a facial challenge is successful, the law in question is declared to be unenforceable
in all its applications, and not just in its particular application to the party in suit. To tell the truth,
it is highly questionable whether federal courts have any business making such a declaration." Id.
at 1867-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611, 614 (1971)).
229. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975). The Powell Court also stated the gen-
eral rule of the vagueness doctrine, which is that Congress could have chosen precise and unam-
biguous language in drafting a statute but did not, does not necessarily mean that a statute is un-
constitutionally vague. See id. at 94.
230. Significantly, Powell involved a facial challenge to a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1715 (making it illegal to mail a pistol, revolver, or other firearm). See Powell, 423 U.S. at 89.
231. Id. at 92. This principle has been cited by other courts. In Kolender, the Court said that
concerns about certainty in criminal statutes have, at times led the Court "to invalidate a criminal
statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application." Kolender,
461 U.S. at 358 n.8 (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. at 394-401); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939)); see also Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 965 n.13 (1984); Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 582 (1974) (upholding a vagueness challenge to criminal statute);
Coates, 402 U.S. 611 (holding that laws so vague that a person of common understanding cannot
know what is forbidden are unconstitutional on their face); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.
399, 404 (1966) (holding constitutionally invalid an 1860 Act which allowed juries to assess
court costs to an acquitted defendant).
232. Powell, 423 U.S. at 92. The Court said that:
An example of such a vague statute is found in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.,
255 U.S. 81, 89. The statue there prohibited any person from "willfully... mak(ing)
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For example, in Lanzetta v. New Jersey,233 the Supreme Court struck
down a statute very similar to RICO that was designed to combat "the
pursuit of criminal enterprises" because the statute contained no
comprehensible course of conduct.234 The statute provided that:
[a]ny person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a
member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been
convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has
been convicted of any crime, in this or in any other State, is declared
to be a gangster.
235
Similar to RICO, the statute in Lanzetta was predicated on the
defendant's commission of prior criminal acts and, like RICO, the
statute was not completely defined.236 The Court recognized that the
phrase "consisting of two or more persons" is all that purported to
define "gang' and found that "the terms it employs to indicate what it
purports to denounce are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that it must
be condemned as repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 237
As Lanzetta shows, striking down RICO's "pattern" requirement as
unconstitutionally vague would not be as extreme as some might
any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in ... dealing in or with any necessaries
.... So worded it "forbids no specific or definite act" and "leaves open ... the wid-
est conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which
no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against."
Id.
233. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
234. Id. at 455 (making it illegal to be a "gangster"). Some have offered "crucial differences"
as to why Lanzetta is not analogous to RICO. One writer has distinguished RICO on the basis
that (1) "RICO does not impact necessarily on First Amendment rights to freedom of associa-
tion;" (2) it is a federal statute; (3) the Department of Justice applies "a 'check' on prosecutorial
discretion in its criminal applications" of RICO; (4) the "term 'pattern' is used and defined in one
of RICO's sister statutes;" and (5) the "Supreme Court has already provided guidance as to the
proper interpretation of the term 'pattern' in RICO." Moran, supra note 22, at 1722-24. These
attempts to distinguish, however, do not necessarily lessen the analogousness of Lanzetta to
RICO. First, in Lanzetta, the Court never mentioned the statute's possible impingement of First
Amendment rights or whether it involved a status crime. The Court struck down the statute
solely because the statutory terms provided were too vague and indefinite to be congruent with
the Due Process Clause. Second, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurrence in H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), the fact that "pattern" was defined else-
where in the Act is hardly persuasive proof that Congress intended that definition to be control-
ling in RICO. See id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring). Just as likely, the opposite it true. Third, the
Department of Justice's "check" on prosecutorial discretion in RICO is hardly a cause to lessen
the standard for vagueness review. See supra note 71 (noting that the Department of Justice ag-
gressively prosecutes RICO). Moreover, checks on prosecutorial discretion cannot satisfy the
notice requirement of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
235. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 451.
236. See supra Part HI (discussing the absence of complete definitions within RICO).
237. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 458.
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claim. 238  Like the definition of "gangster" in Lanzetta, Congress'
definition of "pattern" in RICO is simply too vague and undefined to
prevent the courts from applying the statute without engaging in
common law rulemaking. Although the Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the vagueness of RICO, 239 commentators have voiced
238. At this point, striking down RICO's "pattern" requirement would be significant because
every circuit that has addressed the void-for-vagueness issue following the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in H.J. Inc. has held that the RICO statute's definition of "pattern of racketeering" is not
unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 667 (8th Cir. 1998);
Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1432 (5th Cir. 1995); Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d
1386, 1398 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bennett, 984 F.2d 597, 605-07 (4th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Ashman, 979 F.2d 469, 487 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d
1502, 1508-11 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1102-05 (3d Cir.
1990); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1179 (1st Cir. 1990). Courts have generally
claimed that while RICO may have vagueness problems with respect to a hypothetical defendant,
if RICO clearly applies to the particular defendant before the court, the vagueness challenge fails.
In United States v. Angiulo, the court said that to succeed on a vagueness challenge, a defendant
must demonstrate that "persons of ordinary intelligence in the defendants' situation [would not
have had] fair notice that the gambling, loansharking and conspiracy offenses with which they
were charged constituted an unlawful 'pattern of racketeering activity."' Angiulo, 897 F.2d at
1178-79. Some have been critical of the decisions upholding RICO's constitutionality. See
Luskin, supra note 212, at 780. Luskin argues that:
[T]he cases rejecting constitutional challenges to RICO all derive from a handful of
early cases construing terms other than "pattern of racketeering," or measuring the in-
telligibility of the pattern requirement against definitions that have long since been dis-
carded as overly simplistic. The first trickle of cases spawned by Justice Scalia's con-
currence promises little more. Displaying either commendable restraint or utter
cowardice, depending on one's perspective, the courts seem content to duck the issue
squarely raised by Northwestern Bell through a number of avoidance devices. These
devices include reliance on "precedent," the need to review the statute "as applied," or
focusing the due process inquiry on the predicate offenses rather than the terms of the
RICO statute itself.
Id. (citations omitted). One district court has struck down RICO as being unconstitutionally
vague. In Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1990), a civil case, the court
stuck down RICO on an "as-applied" basis. See id. at 1581. The court said that the circum-
stances of the case, "which involve[d] a dispute between family members concerning whether
certain property should have remained in a relative's estate, [were] in all likelihood far removed
from the typical situations which Congress envisioned as being within RICO's scope of cover-
age." Id. The court held that the "pattern" requirement was unconstitutionally vague as applied
to the defendant, saying that, "assuming the allegations in the complaint were proved, it could not
be said that the pattern requirement had clearly been satisfied regardless of the narrowness of the
interpretation placed upon the term 'pattern."' Id. The court held the "pattern" requirements as
facially invalid, saying that "[t]his court is also persuaded to agree with Justice Scalia's sugges-
tion that the "pattern" requirement is unconstitutionally vague as written." Id.
239. Although the Supreme Court, in H.J. Inc., did not address the vagueness of RICO, Justice
Scalia, in his concurring opinion, voiced his opinion that a challenge to the constitutionality of
RICO's "pattern" requirement might be appropriate. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
492 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia claimed that the Court's ef-
forts in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985), four years earlier to give lower courts
guidance to the "enigmatic term" "pattern of racketeering activity" produced the "widest and
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concerns about the vagueness of RICO's statutory language. 240
Applying the legislative supremacy approach, RICO would be
vulnerable to a facial challenge on the grounds that its "pattern of
racketeering activity" requirement does not set forth a comprehensible
course of conduct. 241  The Court's concerns that facial challenges rest
most persistent Circuit split on an issue of federal law in recent memory" and that the majority
opinion in H.J. Inc. did little more than repromulgate the direction given in Sedima with the
added caveat that Congress intended the Court's direction to be applied using a "flexible ap-
proach." H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia said that the Court's
elevation "to the level of statutory text a phrase taken from the legislative history, ['continuity
plus relationship' is] ... about as helpful [to lower courts] to the conduct of their affairs as 'life is
a fountain."' Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia noted that the Court's interpretation of the "relatedness" prong was a direct
quotation from 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e), a definition for "pattern" contained in another title of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, that "was explicitly not rendered applicable to RICO." Id.
at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia said that "if normal (and sensible) rules of statutory
construction were followed," the definition of "pattern" in RICO could not possibly mean the
same thing as a provision that Congress deemed to not apply to RICO at all. Id. (Scalia, J., con-
curring). Justice Scalia cited Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983), for the proposition
that "where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in an-
other section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
posely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing Russello, 464 U.S. at 23). Justice Scalia admitted, however, that while he was critical of
the Court's efforts, he "would be unable to provide an interpretation of RICO that gives signifi-
cantly more guidance concerning its application." Id. at 254-55 (Scalia, J., concurring). He con-
cluded that:
No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present case, and so that
issue is not before us. That the highest Court in the land has been unable to derive
from this statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day
when that challenge is presented.
Id. at 255-56 (Scalia, J., concurring).
240. Compare Califa, supra note 23, at 843 (concluding that RICO is unconstitutionally
vague), and Kelley, supra note 225, at 380 (noting that a number of circumstances indicate that
the term "pattern" should be held void-for-vagueness), and Jed S. Rakoff, The Unconstitutionality
of RICO, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1990, at 3 (asserting that RICO is unconstitutionally vague), and
Reed, supra note 27, at 721-22 (noting that "the 'continuity' element of H.J. Inc. pattern require-
ment is ripe for a vagueness challenge"), and Skomorowsky, supra note 23, at 756 (concluding
that RICO is unconstitutionally vague), with Moran, supra note 22, at 1755 (asserting that the
"pattern" requirement is not unconstitutionally vague), and Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note,
"Mother of Mercy-Is This the End of Rico? "-Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-
Vagueness Challenge to RICO "Pattern," 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1106, 1149-50 (1990) (ar-
guing that RICO's pattern requirement should not be held unconstitutionally vague).
241. Traditionally the Supreme Court has imposed a high burden of vagueness before invok-
ing the unconstitutionally vague doctrine. See Moran, supra note 22, at 1717 (noting that the Su-
preme Court's cases have come to the conclusion that "[allthough the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine values clarity, proper application of the doctrine does not mean that only the most precisely-
drawn statutes will pass constitutional muster"). The legislative supremacy approach, however, is
consistent with the Court's position regarding the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Under the legis-
lative supremacy conception, imprecisely drawn statutes are dealt with through the rule of lenity
analysis, while statutes that do not set forth a "comprehensible course of conduct" are dealt with
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
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upon hypothetical cases 242 do not apply to situations like RICO where
Congress left key terms so undefined that the standards set are not
comprehensible and, therefore, cannot sufficiently guide judicial
interpretation. 24
3
Under a legislative supremacy approach, the constitutional doctrine
of void-for-vagueness should be used whenever a statute does not
define a comprehensible course of conduct. 244  Although a key
242. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (stating that the declaration of
an act of Congress as unconstitutional should "not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical
cases").
243. The Court in United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948), said that where a great degree
of uncertainty existed as to Congress' intended penalty for a violation of the Immigration Act of
1917, the Court should refrain from choosing among the possible interpretations of the statute.
See id. at 495. In deciding that its task exceeded the bounds of judicial interpretation, the Court
described when a court should refuse to choose from among competing interpretations of criminal
statutes:
If there were less inconsistency among the tentative possibilities put forward or greater
consistency with the section's wording implicit in one, resolution of the difficulty by
judicial action would involve a less wide departure from the common function of judi-
cial interpretation of statutes than is actually required by this case. But here the task is
too large. With both of the parties we agree that Congress meant to make criminal and
to punish acts of concealing or harboring. But we do not know, we can only guess
with too large a degree of uncertainty, which one of the several possible constructions
Congress thought to apply.
Id.
244. Congress' choice to draft RICO in a very broad manner and courts' inability to deal ef-
fectively with that choice has worked to the disadvantage of the administration of RICO. Be-
cause of the lack of any coherent definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" in § 1961(5), the
Supreme Court was forced to create its own definition of "pattern" in H.J. Inc. See supra notes
91-101 and accompanying text. The incoherence of the Supreme Court's definition led to confu-
sion and inadequate guidance for lower courts. This led to a weak pattern requirement in deci-
sions, such as United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989), where multiple predicate
acts committed within seconds of each other in a single criminal transaction were held to have
met the "pattern" requirement. See id. at 1371. The Second Circuit held that Indelicato's partici-
pation in three murders as part of a single criminal transaction, the only predicate acts alleged
against Indelicato, could constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity" by reasoning that "[w]here
the enterprise is an entity whose business is racketeering activity, an act performed in furtherance
of that business automatically carries with it the threat of continued racketeering activity" suffi-
cient to meet the "pattern" requirement. Id. at 1383-84. In addition to cases like Indelicato,
courts have held that certain crimes, by their very nature, satisfy the "continuity" requirement. In
United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1993), the defendant "used his duties and respon-
sibilities as a legislative aide to move two special interest bills through the California legislature
in exchange for payments." Id. at 595. The court held that by their nature, crimes such as bribery
suggest the threat of long-term activity. See id. at 596.
The Court's inadequate guidance has led to incoherent attempts by lower courts to further de-
fine the "pattern requirement." See United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536, 541 (2d Cir. 1998).
In attempting to provide a more precise definition of "relatedness," the Polanco court said that
"[piredicate acts "must be related to each other ('horizontal' relatedness), and they must be re-
lated to the enterprise ('vertical' relatedness)." Id. (quoting United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d
1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992)). The court explained that to satisfy the "vertical relatedness" re-
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component of the legislative supremacy approach, the void-for-
vagueness doctrine should not be thought of as a sufficient device for
the Court to use in insuring that Congress enacts sufficiently clear
criminal statutes. 245 Instead, it should be used in tandem with the rule
of lenity, a "junior version of the vagueness doctrine," 246 to ensure
legislative supremacy.
247
VI. CONCLUSION
The legislative supremacy conception is the best approach to federal
criminal statutory interpretation because it ultimately promotes judicial
restraint, political accountability and consistent statutory interpretation.
Moreover, it is the approach with which the judiciary is most
comfortable. The two doctrines used to enforce legislative supremacy,
the unconstitutionally vague doctrine and the rule of lenity, 248 are
quirement, "[a] predicate act is 'related' to an enterprise if it is 'related to the activities of that
enterprise.' Id. (quoting Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106). In describing the "horizontal relatedness"
requirement, the court said that "[a] predicate act is related to a different predicate act if each
predicate act is related to the enterprise." Id. (citing Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106). Unfortunately,
the Polanco court's additional gloss not only failed to provide much helpful guidance, but con-
flated its vertical and horizontal relatedness requirements by defining the "horizontal relatedness"
requirement as requiring nothing more than the required showing for the "vertical relatedness"
requirement. By requiring only that the predicate acts be related to the activities of the enterprise
to satisfy the "horizontal relatedness" requirement, the court did not further elucidate or narrow
H.J. Inc.'s all inclusive definition.
245. The Court has frequently maintained that absolute clarity may never be achievable. See,
e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (noting that "we can never expect
mathematical certainty from our language"); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (re-
jecting efforts to "convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing
criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and suffi-
ciently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited").
246. Supra notes 211-42 and accompanying text (discussing the vagueness doctrine).
247. It is difficult to clearly distinguish between the void-for-vagueness and rule of lenity
doctrines because the void-for-vagueness doctrine comprises both vagueness and ambiguity. See
Waldron, supra note 1, at 513. Waldron comments that "'vagueness' is supposed to refer to any
form of indeterminacy that encourages unwarranted discretion or leaves the citizen without rea-
sonable notice of what is required of her." Id. at 514. The difference between the two doctrines
in some cases is probably a matter of degree. While RICO's enterprise concept is perhaps uncon-
stitutionally vague overall, in the specific instance of the Scheidler case, it was appropriate to deal
with the issue of whether RICO's enterprise concept requires an economic motive through the use
of the rule of lenity. In other cases, such as H.J. Inc., the void-for-vagueness doctrine would be
appropriate because a court would have to engage in common law rulemaking in order to give
definition to the "pattern of racketeering activity" requirement. See SOLAN, supra note 148, at
105.
248. The rule of lenity is simply too ingrained in the judicial culture to jettison it at this point.
Solan notes that although "the legislatures of many states replaced the rule of strict construction
with the principle that courts should follow the legislative will," even judges in those states "that
have rejected lenity use it anyway when the court has no other basis for deciding what to do."
Solan, supra note 71, at 122.
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historically rooted doctrines that comport well with courts' preferences
for employing traditional methods of statutory interpretation as well as
their reluctance to assume criminal law rulemaking power. If the
legislative supremacy approach had been used by the Court in
interpreting RICO, the result would have been a narrower, clearer
statute that better preserved congressional responsibility to define crime.
